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Abstract
Datasets of individual investor trading records have been an important
source of empirical evidence in the field of behavioural finance. This thesis
contributes to two topics within this empirical literature using a dataset of
trading records from a discount brokerage. The first topic is the disposition
effect (DE), the tendency for investors to sell winning positions at a faster
rate than losing positions. A version of the aggregate DE score introduced
by Odean (1998) is analysed, as a time series and at the level of individual
stocks. The influence of each stock on the aggregate DE score is calculated,
and the characteristics of high and low influence stocks compared. A formal
relationship is derived between this DE score and the hazard ratio estimated
in a proportional hazards (PH) model.
PH models have been used in the literature to measure the effect of covariates
on the DE at the investor level. Past approaches have used a marginal model
to address the problem of correlation between positions at the investor-level,
which involves computing robust standard errors after estimation of the
model. A shared frailty model is tested as a more flexible alternative, where
unobserved heterogeneity is modelled through the use of latent variables. It
provides a significantly improved fit relative to the corresponding marginal
model, and adheres more closely to the PH assumption.
The second topic is the preference of investors for lottery stocks. These are
stocks that are low in price and high in volatility and skewness, a scheme of
stock categorisation suggested by Kumar (2009a). The theme of using more
flexible models to accommodate investor-level correlation is continued, with
a mixed-effects logistic regression being used to study the factors affecting
the decision to purchase a lottery stock. This allows the comparison of both
time-varying and static factors.
xv
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Overview
It is now widely accepted in the fields of economics and finance that the
decisions people make are often not rational in a way that is consistent with
expected utility theory. This has given rise to a rich literature of new theo-
ries of decision making, with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
and mental accounting (Thaler, 1985) being two prominent examples. An
important inspiration for these theories has been the empirical evidence col-
lected on decision making in a variety of settings. One such source has been
datasets of financial trading records. The stock market represents a high-
stakes environment that is highly structured and relatively self-contained
compared to other domains in which people make important decisions. For
example, the value and riskiness of an asset can be clearly defined using
market data, and the timing of events is recorded with high precision.
This makes trading record datasets ideal for detecting patterns of behaviour
that can provide evidence for or against theoretical models. Financial trad-
ing is also of inherent interest due to the welfare implications of system-
atically poor decision making. Datasets of trading records are not widely
available due to the sensitive nature of the information they contain. But
a number of large datasets of this kind have been studied in the literature,
including the LDB dataset used in this thesis.1 This empirical literature has
provided some of the best evidence on decision making in general. These
1See section 1.2 for details.
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empirical studies and the rigorous theoretical models of financial decision
making together comprise the behavioural finance literature. An overview
of this literature as it relates in particular to the decision making of individ-
ual investors can be found in Barber and Odean (2011).
This thesis contributes to two topics on the empirical side of this literature.
The first is the disposition effect (DE), which is the tendency for investors
to sell stocks that have increased in price since purchase at a faster rate
than stocks that have decreased in price. One approach to measuring the
DE has been the use of an aggregate score first suggested by Odean (1998),
which compares the number of sales for a gain or loss to the number of
total opportunities to make such a sale that occurred. A modified version
of the Odean score is analysed in chapter 1. This includes decomposing
it into a time series and to the level of individual stocks. The influence
of each stock on the aggregate DE score can then be quantified, and the
characteristics of high and low influence stocks compared. This analysis
aids the understanding of how an aggregate DE, as measured by the Odean
score, arises in practice.
More recent approaches to measuring the DE have used proportional haz-
ards (PH) regression models, a class of models from survival analysis that
estimate the rate at which positions are sold directly. The Cox PH model
(Cox et al., 1972) is introduced in chapter 1 and demonstrated using the
LDB dataset. Particular attention is paid to checking the PH assumption, a
step that is often neglected in the existing literature. A formal relationship
is derived between the hazard ratio for gains relative to losses, as estimated
by the Cox model, and the Odean DE score. This has been missing from the
literature thus far, and helps connect the DE with survival analysis methods
more closely.
A key aim of the DE literature has been to determine which factors affect
the severity of the DE at the investor level. PH models have been a popular
choice for this task. An important feature of trading record datasets is the
xix
natural grouping of positions based on which investor it was that held them.
Correlation between positions held by the same investor can be problematic
in a model where one investor can contribute multiple positions. For the
LDB dataset, this problem is made worse by the fact that the distribution
of positions across investors is extremely imbalanced: many investors hold
only a few positions during the data period whereas some hold many hun-
dreds. Past approaches have dealt with this correlation by using a marginal
model, which entails computing robust standard errors after the model has
been estimated. Chapter 2 explores the use of a shared frailty model as a
more flexible alternative, where unobserved heterogeneity between investors
is modelled explicitly through the use of latent variables, called frailties.
Compared to a corresponding marginal model, the frailty model provides a
significantly improved fit to the LDB data. It is also shown to adhere much
more closely to the proportional hazards assumption.
Chapter 3 continues with the theme of using flexible models to account for
investor level correlation. It uses this approach to study purchases of lottery
stocks. These are stocks that are low in price and high in volatility and skew-
ness, a scheme of stock categorisation introduced by Kumar (2009a). This
chapter uses logistic regression at the level of individual purchases to model
the odds of a particular purchase being of a lottery stock. Since investors can
make many purchases during the data period, random effects are included
at the investor level to control for this source of correlation. This approach
allows the inclusion of both time-varying covariates capturing information
about an investor’s portfolio and recent behaviour, and static information
about their demographic background. The results of this analysis provide
new evidence on the relative importance of these different factors, partic-
ularly an investor’s recent experience with lottery stocks and the recent
performance of lottery stocks as a group in the market.
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Chapter 1
Defining, measuring and
decomposing the disposition
effect
1.1 Introduction
The disposition effect (DE) is the tendency for investors to sell gains (assets
that have increased in price since purchase) and hold losses (assets that
have decreased in price since purchase). More quantitative definitions refer
to the rate at which positions are sold, with the DE corresponding to the
situation where gains are sold at a greater rate than losses. The DE is
the most consistently observed behavioural pattern in datasets of investor
trading records, having been documented in a number of different financial
markets and countries1. It has received a great deal of attention since, as
an investment strategy, it contradicts the standard advice to cut losses and
let winners run, and is sub-optimal in terms of minimizing capital gains
1See Barber and Odean (2011) for a comprehensive list
1
tax.2
There is also evidence that investors earn lower returns as a result of the
DE due to the momentum present in stock prices. This momentum is doc-
umented in the U.S. by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), who find that a
momentum trading strategy generates significant positive returns for hold-
ing periods up to one year. In a dataset of investor trading records, Odean
(1998) finds that gains that are sold outperform losses that remain unsold
by an average of 3.4 percentage points over the year following the sale.
Together with the consideration of tax, this suggests that investors would
improve their performance if they did not exhibit the DE.
A variety of different methods have been used to measure the DE in the
empirical literature. This chapter will describe the different approaches and
examine two in detail. The first is a modification of the score introduced
by Odean (1998), based on finding the ratio of sales for a gain or a loss to
the number of opportunities investors had to make such a sale. This score
is analysed using the LDB dataset of individual investor trading records,
which is used throughout this thesis and introduced in the next section.
For exploratory purposes, and to understand how an aggregate DE arises
in practice, the score is decomposed both into its component parts and
calculated for subsets of the data. This includes calculating it monthly to
produce a time series, which leads to an investigation into why the aggregate
DE score falls in 1995/96. The score is also calculated for individual stocks,
which allows the contribution of each stock to the aggregate DE score to be
quantified. This leads to a notion of influence analogous to the DFBETA
quantity used to measure influence in regression analysis. The characteristics
of stocks that have high influence on the aggregate DE score are studied,
along with the changes in influence over time.
The second method to be examined is the Cox proportional hazard regression
2This is discussed in Shefrin and Statman (1985), with reference to the tax-optimal
behaviour derived in Constantinides (1984).
2
model, a method from survival analysis. This method has become popular in
the study of the DE, and in particular for measuring the effect of covariates
on the DE at the investor level. The method is introduced and demonstrated
using the LDB dataset. Particular focus is given to testing the important
proportional hazards assumption, a step that is typically neglected in the
existing literature. Finally, the relationship between the modified Odean
measure of the DE and the hazard ratio produced by a Cox model is formally
derived. It is shown that the Odean score is proportional to a non-parametric
estimator for the hazard ratio, and a simple condition is given for when the
latter will exceed the former in magnitude.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 intro-
duces the datasets that will be used throughout this thesis. Section 1.3 dis-
cusses past approaches to measuring the DE. Section 1.4 defines the modified
Odean score that will be used subsequently. Section 1.5 presents analysis
resulting from decomposing the aggregate DE score. Section 1.6 introduces
the Cox model and section 1.7 demonstrates its use with the LDB dataset.
Section 1.8 derives a relationship between the modified Odean score and a
non-parametric estimator for the hazard ratio that is produced by the Cox
model.
1.2 Data
The main dataset used in this thesis consists of the trading records and a
variety of demographic information for 78,000 investors at a large discount
brokerage firm in the U.S. from the beginning of January 1991 until the
end of November 1996. The data were obtained by Odean from a large
discount brokerage and are commonly referred to in the literature as the
LDB dataset.3 A detailed description of the dataset can be found in Barber
3We are grateful to Terrance Odean for sharing this dataset with us.
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and Odean (2000). The LDB dataset is notable for the large number of
investors it contains, the relatively long period of time it covers and the
range of demographic information about the investors that was collected
alongside the trading records. Several studies that are important references
for this thesis also used the LDB dataset in their respective analyses, a fact
that will be pointed out when these references are introduced.
As reported in Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), 62,387 investors in the dataset
trade common stocks, which is the only asset type considered here. The me-
dian investor holds a portfolio consisting of three stocks, with a total value
of $13,869. Barber and Odean (2000) find that the mean investor in the
dataset turns over 75% of their stock portfolio each year and underperforms
the market by 1.5% annually. A defining feature of the LDB dataset is the
large degree of heterogeneity that is present in essentially all aspects of in-
vestor behaviour. This includes total portfolio value, level of diversification,
trading frequency and stock-type preference. In models where one investor
can contribute multiple observations to the sample, controlling for this het-
erogeneity and the correlation between groups of observations that it causes
is an important part of the modelling process. Investor-level correlation was
a key motivation behind the choice of the models used in chapters 2 and 3,
and the topic will be discussed in more detail there.
Data on stock prices, SIC industry and capitalization were obtained from
the CRSP, and the analysis is limited to stocks that have price information
in the CRSP database. These prices, as well as those in the LDB files were
corrected for splits and dividends using the information provided by the
CRSP. Multiple buys and sells of the same stock on the same day by an
investor were aggregated, a standard processing step.
4
1.3 Past approaches to measuring the dispo-
sition effect
1.3.1 Aggregate measures
Holding-period approaches
The DE was first theorised by Shefrin and Statman (1985), and the authors
provided some empirical support for its existence. They analyse a dataset
containing the trading records for 2,506 individual investors in the U.S.
during the period 1964-70, originally studied in Schlarbaum et al. (1978).
The authors find that 60% of round-trip trades, where both the purchase
and sale are observed during the data period, end in a sale for a gain. This
percentage remains the same for different lengths of holding period. The
authors cite this as evidence for the DE, as sales for a loss should be more
common at short holding periods if investors are minimising their capital
gains tax burden.
The holding period of round-trip trades is also used by Shapira and Venezia
(2001) in their study of the trading records of 4,330 individual investors
in Israel during 1994. They find that the average holding period of stocks
sold for a loss is 63 days, compared to 20 days for stocks sold for a gain.
For investors receiving professional advice the gap was somewhat smaller,
with an average holding period of 55 days for losses and 25 days for gains.
Importantly there was no capital gains tax in Israel at the time, so their
analysis is not complicated by the issue of tax.
Odean count-based approach
As pointed out in Odean (1998), the problem with measures based on holding
periods is that they do not consider the number of opportunities an investor
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had to sell for a gain or a loss before they eventually did so. This can lead
to a DE not being detected in a situation where we would expect it to be
based on the qualitative definition of the DE. As a simple example, suppose
an investor buys stocks A and B on the same day. On the next day, both
stocks are trading at a loss and the investor sells stock A, and on the next
day stock B is trading at a gain and the investor sells it. So 1/1 opportunities
were taken to sell for a gain, compared to 1/2 for losses. The holding period
for losses was shorter than for gains which would indicate no DE, yet the
investor exhibited a greater eagerness to realize gains.
Instead, Odean (1998) proposes calculating the ratio of the number of sales
for a gain or loss relative to the number of opportunities an investor had to
do so. An opportunity to sell for a gain (loss) is defined as a day where the
daily low and high prices for the stock being held are above (below) the price
the stock was purchased at. Days when an investor had the opportunity to
sell for a gain/loss are labelled as ’realised’ gains/losses, and days where they
had the opportunity but did not take it are labelled as ’paper’ gains/losses.
Whether a stock position is currently trading at a gain or a loss will be
referred to as the paper status of the position. Importantly, under the
specification in Odean (1998), paper gains and losses are only counted on
days when the investor sells at least one stock in their portfolio. This choice
will be discussed in section 1.4.
Using this information two ratios are computed, the proportion of gains
realized (PGR) and the proportion of losses realized (PLR) with formulas
given by
PGR =
Realized Gains
Realized Gains + Paper Gains
(1.1)
PLR =
Realized Losses
Realized Losses + Paper Losses
(1.2)
6
with PGR > PLR indicating that there is a DE. The ratio PGR/PLR is
commonly used to summarise the DE in a single value, with PGR/PLR > 1
indicating a DE is present. These ratios are computed in Odean (1998)
using the trading records of 10,000 individual investors in the U.S. during
the period 1987-934. He reports a PGR of 0.148 and a PLR of 0.098, which
gives a ratio of PGR/PLR of 1.51. Importantly, the DE is reversed, i.e.
PGR/PLR is < 1 if only days in December are counted. This supports the
hypothesis that investors engage in tax-loss selling in December, the last
month in which it is possible to do so before the end of the tax year, in
order to reduce their tax burden.
1.3.2 Regression models
The work of Odean provided the first robust evidence for the existence of the
disposition effect in a large dataset of individual investor trading records.
The next step pursued by several authors was to test theories about factors
that may effect the extent of the DE, such as the characteristics of individual
investors. The main approaches will be detailed below.
Dhar and Zhu (2006) calculate the DE individually for 14,872 investors using
their trading records from the period 1991-96. This is the same dataset as
used for the analysis in this thesis.5 The authors then regress these DE scores
on a range of variables including the investor’s age, the number of trades
they made during the data period, an indicator for whether they work in a
professional occupation and categories for high and low income. They find
that older, wealthier investors who work in a professional occupation and
trade more frequently have a significantly reduced DE. Their results will be
compared to those of the analysis conducted in chapter 2.
4This dataset comes from the same discount brokerage as the LDB dataset.
5The dataset contains trading records for 78,000 investors, but only 14,872 make at
least six trades (a condition for inclusion made by the authors) and have a sufficient
number of observed round-trip trades for a DE to be calculated.
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As the authors note, DE scores at the individual level are highly dependent
on the number of trades an investor makes, and extreme values for the score
are not uncommon. These usually occur as a result of either the PGR or
PLR being close to or exactly zero. In addition to this, many investors
have to be excluded from the analysis because they do not have a sufficient
number of trades for a DE score to be computed. An alternative approach is
to model position lifetimes, and test whether the paper status of a position
affects its chances of being sold. This avoids having to calculate the DE at
the level of individual investors, and instead the effect of the paper status
on an investor’s decision to sell can be estimated using information from
all investors. Two types of model have been used for this purpose: logistic
regression and proportional hazards (PH) regression. Examples of both will
be described before the key differences between them are highlighted.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) use logistic regression to examine how past
returns and price patterns of stocks affect the probability of a position being
sold in a dataset from Finland. The dataset contains the trades made by
all Finnish investors, both individual and institutional, during the period
from the end of December 1994 to the beginning of January 1997. Similarly
to Odean (1998), for each investor, the authors only record observations on
days when the investor made at least one sale. On each such day, for all
positions in the investor’s portfolio, the value of a sell indicator variable is
recorded plus the values of the accompanying covariates at that point in
time.
The sell indicator equals one if at least some of the investor’s position in the
stock is sold on that day, and zero otherwise. The covariates may reflect
characteristics of the particular stock or the investor, and can be fixed over
the whole period (e.g. the category of the investor) or change over time (e.g.
the past return of the stock over a particular horizon). The value of the sell
indicator and the accompanying covariate values constitute one observation
in the subsequent regression. They find that recent negative returns are
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associated with a decreased probability of selling and recent positive returns
are associated with an increased probability of selling, consistent with the
presence of a DE.
Feng and Seasholes (2005) use a parametric proportional hazards model to
investigate whether investor sophistication and experience reduce the dispo-
sition effect (see section 1.6 for some detail on proportional hazards models).
They study the trading records of 1,511 accounts held at a large brokerage
in China from January 1999 to December 2000. Unlike in Odean (1998)
and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), the status of the stocks in an investors
portfolio is recorded on every day that they are held. Specifically, for each
day a stock is held, the value of a sale indicator is recorded (equal to one if
the stock is sold on that day) and the value of the accompanying covariates
is recorded. This is done for every position an investor holds during the data
period.6
The key covariates are indicators for whether a stock is trading at a gain or a
loss on a certain day. The trading gain indicator (TGI) is equal to one if the
daily low price is above the purchase price, and the trading loss indicator
(TLI) is equal to one if the daily high price is below the purchase price.
The authors estimate separate models for each of these two covariates, and
find a reduced rate of selling when a stock is trading at a loss and a greatly
increased rate when trading at a gain. The authors also propose measures
of investor sophistication and experience, and test whether they have an
effect on the strength of the DE in their data. These results will again be
compared to the similar analysis which is conducted in chapter 2.
The main difference between logistic and PH regression models is that in
the logistic model there is no distinction between observations that occur at
different times during the holding period of a position. All intervals (single
6The authors define the holding period of a position as starting when the investor first
purchases a stock (which they do not already hold) and ending when they have sold the
position in its entirety.
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days in this case) are effectively treated as having happened simultaneously.
In a PH model, positions that have been sold are compared only to other
positions that were at risk of being sold at that time.7 This is important
because in a PH model there is a component, called the baseline hazard
function, that captures the risk of being sold that is common across all posi-
tions, analogous to an intercept term in a linear regression model. However
the baseline hazard function can be dependent on time, allowing the risk of
a position being sold to be different depending on how long the investor has
already held it. In contrast, the logistic model implicitly assumes there is
no such difference. If it does change over time then a PH model will better
reflect the situation in reality.
PH models separate out this baseline hazard from the effect of the covari-
ates, and assume only that the covariates have a multiplicative effect on the
baseline hazard that is constant over time. The PH model that is used in
this thesis will be described in detail in section 1.6. Whilst a PH model
will be used for formal testing of the effect covariates have on the DE in
chapter 2, a count-based measure of the DE, similar to that of Odean, will
be used in the present chapter to complement the regression analysis. The
count-based measure will be useful for detecting aggregate patterns that can
then be tested formally using the regression model. Decomposing the mea-
sure into its component parts, and into a time series will also add to the
understanding of how aggregate measures of this kind work in datasets of
trading records. The next section will provide a definition of the count-based
measure of the DE that will be used in subsequent sections.
7Note that ’time’ refers here to the time since a position was purchased. Hence sold
stocks are compared to those that had been held for the same number of days, but not
necessarily at the same calendar time. This distinction is discussed in section 1.6.
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1.4 Modified Odean-ratio
In their examination of the aggregate DE in the LDB dataset, the following
sections will use the PGR and PLR ratios introduced in Odean (1998), with
two important differences. Odean’s method only counted paper gains and
losses on days when the investor sold at least one other position in their
portfolio. Here, all days during the holding period of a position on which it
is not sold will be counted.8 The criteria for a position representing either a
paper gain or a loss are the same: it is a paper gain if the daily low price is
above the purchase price, and a paper loss if the daily high price is below the
purchase price. Hence there will be days during the holding period where
the position is neither a paper gain nor loss, and it will not contribute to
any of the DE components i.e. PGR or PLR.
There are arguments on both sides for which method best reflects the con-
ditions under which investors were making their decisions at the time. On
a day when an investor sells a position, it is reasonable to assume they also
checked the current price of their other positions. Hence the presence of a
sale on that day provides the strongest signal that they considered selling a
position but decided not to. However, there are also likely to be days when
an investor checks the price of stocks they hold but takes no action. These
days would not be counted when using Odean’s method, but would by the
method used here.
It is not clear which total will best reflect the number of days when an
investor was aware of the price of a stock they held and chose not to sell.
During the 1990s, the time in which the LDB data was collected, stock
prices were available in print, by telephone, on TV channels and later, via
the Internet9. So investors who wanted to know the current status of their
8To be precise, ’all days’ means U.S. business days i.e. days on which it was possible
to trade stocks.
9The majority of actual trading in this dataset was conducted via telephone, but with
a significant shift towards trading online towards the end of the data period. See Barber
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positions would easily have been able to do so. Counting all days during
the holding period also follows the general principle in statistics of using as
much information as possible in any analysis that is being done.
The second difference is that, unlike in Odean’s method, sales of a position
that occur when an investor holds no other positions at the time will be
included in the counts of realized gains and losses. An investor holding only
one position is a common occurrence in this dataset, and making this change
doubles the number of sales that are recorded in total (from ∼315,000 to
∼630,000). These two changes bring the method more in line with more
recent survival analysis approaches using PH regression models, such as in
Feng and Seasholes (2005) and Barber and Odean (2011). The connection
with survival analysis methods will be discussed in section 1.8. In these
models the units of analysis are the holding periods of stock positions. The
holding period of a position is the number of days from the date of purchase
until the position is sold, hence recording paper gains and losses on all days
during the holding period of a position makes a count based method more
comparable to results from a PH regression model.
Together these changes greatly increase the number of investors and stocks
that contribute to the aggregate DE components. An investor or stock
contributes to the aggregate DE when positions held by the investor, or
in the stock, add to at least one of the four DE components i.e. realized
gains/losses or paper gains/losses. Under Odean’s original scheme, 28,450
investors make a contribution to the aggregate DE, compared to 62,473
investors in the modified scheme. Amongst stocks, 2,299 make a contribution
in the original scheme and 9,812 do after the modification.
For a disposition effect score, the ratio of PGR and PLR will be used
DE =
PGR
PLR
(1.3)
and Odean (2001b, 2002) for some detail on this.
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If this ratio is greater than 1 then there is a disposition effect i.e. investors
take a greater proportion of their opportunities to sell for a gain than for a
loss.
To compare the original Odean scheme with the modified version, this score
can be computed for all stocks traded in the dataset. In both cases, for it
to be possible to compute a score a stock must have at least one realised
loss, otherwise PLR, the denominator of the score, would be zero.10 This
restriction means it is possible to compute both scores for only 2,031 stocks.
For this set of stocks, the Pearson correlation between the two scores is 0.62
and there is agreement in 75% of cases as to whether there is a DE (score
> 1) or not.
1.5 Decomposing the disposition effect
Scores of the kind discussed in the previous section have mainly been used
in the literature to establish the presence of the DE, averaged across large
groups of investors, stocks and also across time. Further insight can be
gained however by decomposing the aggregate score. The following sections
will do this by separating it into its component parts, and by calculating it
for subsets of the full dataset. Doing so will reveal broad trends in the data,
and thus serve as a useful exploratory step prior to the regression modelling
that will be done in chapter 2. Results of the analysis here will inform the
choice of covariates in the models that will subsequently be estimated. But
this kind of decomposition will also help explain how an aggregate DE, as a
statistical phenomenon, arises in practice.
Section 1.5.1 will consider the DE as a time series by calculating it for
10This problem would be avoided by using DE = PGR − PLR, as some authors do.
However, using their ratio makes the result more comparable with results from other
studies that have been computed under a different specification, for example the original
results in Odean (1998).
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each month during the data period. Whilst a tax-motivated fall in the
DE in December has been found by Odean (1998) and others, changes in
the aggregate DE over time have not been examined in detail. This is
partly because most datasets used in the literature do not cover more than
a few years, unlike the LDB dataset which covers a six year period. By
decomposing the DE into its component parts and seeing how they change
over time, section 1.5.2 is able to establish which part is the primary driver
behind the fall in aggregate DE in ’95 and ’96. Rather than large changes
in the number of stocks investors sell for a gain or a loss, it is the dramatic
fall in the number of opportunities to sell for a loss that causes the fall in
DE. This can in turn be connected with the market conditions which were
in effect at the time: strong stock market performance at the start of what
became the dotcom boom meant investors had far fewer opportunities to sell
their positions at a loss, but likely still wanted to do so in order to off-set
capital gains and reduce their tax burden.
Some work has been done on variations in magnitude of the DE between
stocks. Kumar (2009b) finds that difficult to value stocks exhibit a greater
disposition effect. This includes stocks with higher volatility, lower market
capitalization and weaker price momentum. That positions in stocks with
smaller market capitalisations exhibit a stronger DE is confirmed in sec-
tion 1.5.3. Section 1.5.4 extends the work of Kumar by decomposing the
DE into the parts contributed by each stock. The influence of each stock on
the aggregate DE can then be calculated. Influence is highly concentrated
amongst a small group of stocks, the majority of which are in the top quin-
tile in terms of market capitalization. However, this is true for both stocks
that make the aggregate DE stronger and those that make it weaker. So
whilst large cap stocks do have a lower DE as a group, it is a small number
of large cap stocks that make the DE stronger to the greatest degree.
By defining high and low influence groups using percentiles in the influence
distribution, section 1.5.4 also shows how the impact stocks have on the
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aggregate DE can change over time. Examining the characteristics of stocks
as they move between influence groups shows that stocks which become
more DE strengthening also increased in volatility on average, whilst stocks
moving in the other direction decreased.
1.5.1 The disposition effect as a time series
When the DE component parts are counted for each stock position, the date
of the count observation is also recorded. Hence for any time period lasting
at least one day, the component counts that occurred during that period
can be summed and a DE score calculated. Due to the relevance of calendar
months in financial markets, an aggregate DE score for each month during
the data period will be calculated in order to construct a time series for the
DE.
A monthly scale is also important due to the presence of a strong ’December
effect’ in data of this kind. As a result of the time of the deadline for
recording capital gains and losses in the U.S. tax system, the number of
realized losses increases dramatically in December. In a similar dataset to
the one studied here, Odean (1998) finds that the DE is actually reversed
in December, with the proportion of losses realized being greater than the
proportion of gains realized. Studying a monthly time series of DE scores
will highlight the change in investor behaviour during December, and also
allow comparison between Decembers in different years.
Since the data start in January ’91 and end in November ’96 there are 71
months in total for which a DE score can be calculated. At the start of
the data period the number of stock positions under observation increases
from zero as investors make their first recorded trades.11 The magnitude
of DE component counts is therefore much lower in the first few months of
11There are significantly more buys than sells in this dataset, so the number of stock
positions under observation steadily increases throughout the period.
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’91 relative to the rest of the data period, and as a result the corresponding
ratios are sensitive to small changes in the data. To keep them informative,
the time series plots in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 start in April ’91 rather than
January.
Figure 1.1: A monthly time series of the aggregate disposition effect, across
all investors and stocks. The component parts are split according to the
month they occurred in, and a disposition effect score calculated according
to the formula described in Section 1.4. The data run from January 1991 to
November 1996. The first few months are very volatile due to a low number
of stocks being under observation, hence the figure is started in April 1991.
The monthly series of DE scores is shown in Figure 1.1. The most notable
features of this series are the clearly evident December effect in years ’92-
’95, and the dramatic fall in DE during ’95, which is maintained during
’96. This latter feature will be discussed in depth in section 1.5.2. Whilst
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the December effect is visible in ’92-’95 (the data period only goes as far
as November in ’96), the DE score does not fall in December ’91. One of
the results in chapter 2 is that the December effect is weaker for positions
that have not been held very long. DE components are only counted for
positions where the purchase was observed during the data period, hence all
of the positions under observation in December ’91 were relatively new at
the time. This suggests the apparent lack of a December effect in that year
is really an artefact of the dataset.
To understand why the DE changes over time, it can be split into its compo-
nent parts with separate time series plotted for each. Figure 1.2 shows the
monthly series for the proportion of gains realized (PGR) and proportion of
losses realized (PLR), starting in April ’91. The large values at the start of
both series are mostly a result of the low number of positions under obser-
vation at the time. As this number increases, both PGR and PLR steadily
fall up until part way through ’94. Yet the ratio between them does not
change much except in December months, hence the consistent structure in
the DE score series during this period.
1.5.2 Explaining the fall in 1995/6
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show the number of gain and loss sales per month, and
number of paper gain and loss days per month respectively. Paper gain and
loss days occur when a position is trading at a gain or loss relative to the
purchase price, but the investor does not take the opportunity to sell the
stock and realize the gain or loss. As mentioned previously, there are no
positions under observation at the start of the data period, hence all the
series start at zero. Since there are more buys than sells overall, the number
under observation steadily grows over the course of the data period. This
explains the general upwards trend visible in these figures.
Figure 1.2 showed that the fall in aggregate DE in ’95 and ’96 was primarily
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Figure 1.2: A monthly time series of the proportion of gains realized (PGR)
and the proportion of losses realized (PLR). Or alternatively, the proportion
of opportunities to sell for a gain or loss that investors take in aggregate.
Again the plot is started in April 1991 due to the low amount of data avail-
able to calculate the ratios with at the start of the period.
18
Figure 1.3: The number of sales for a gain and the number of sales for a loss
each month during the data period, across all investors and stocks.
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Figure 1.4: The number of days each month, summed across all investors
and stocks, where a stock position was trading at a gain and was not sold,
and the number where a stock position was trading at a loss and was not
sold.
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due to the increase in the proportion of losses realized; investors took more of
their opportunities to sell for a loss during these two years. Figure 1.3 shows
that the number of sales for a loss does not change significantly when PLR
rises, it continues on the steady upwards trend that it had been following
for most of the first four years of the data period. The increase in PLR
is instead explained by the significant fall in the number of loss days, in
absolute terms but particularly when compared to its upwards path over
the first four years. This means that investors had far fewer opportunities
to sell stocks for a loss, but still chose to sell a similar number of losses in
absolute terms. Hence the proportion of losses realized increases and the
DE falls.
The fall in the number of days on which investors’ stock positions were
trading at a loss can be explained by the strong performance of the U.S.
stock market in general starting in ’95. In the period 1991-93, the S&P
500 index returned 7.6%, 10.0% and 1.32% respectively each year. In ’95,
the index returned 37.8%, signalling the start of a stock market boom that
continued until the dotcom crash in 2000. In market conditions where prices
were rising rapidly across the full spectrum of stocks, investors simply did
not have as many opportunities to sell positions at a loss compared to the
previous few years.
As can be seen in figure 1.3, investors did increase the number of stocks
they sold for a gain in response to the strong performance of their positions.
Since the number of opportunities to sell for a gain had increased the propor-
tion of gains realized ends up not changing much compared to the previous
few years. But as mentioned previously, investors maintained, and in fact
steadily increased, the number of stocks they sold for a loss despite the large
fall in the number of opportunities they had to do so. One explanation for
this is that investors still wanted to realize capital losses in order to offset
the now increased amount of capital gains they were realizing, and hence
minimize the capital gains tax they needed to pay.
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In a different dataset, Seru et al. (2010) also find a fall in the aggregate DE
over time and show that it is partly due to low ability investors deciding
to cease trading. This phenomenon could also explain some of the observed
decline in aggregate DE in the LDB dataset. However, in the regression
model estimated in chapter 2, there is an indicator variable for whether a
position is being held during the years 1995/6 or not. This indicator is highly
significant in explaining variation in the DE even whilst variables capturing
the experience and sophistication of the investor holding the position are
also included. It is unlikely this would be the case if all of the decline in
aggregate DE during these two years could be explained by changes in the
composition of investors who were actively trading.
1.5.3 The disposition effect and market capitalization
An important question which will be addressed in this and subsequent sec-
tions is whether the DE affects different types of stocks to different extents.
Market capitalization, or cap-size, is an important stock-level characteristic
and is the primary way that stocks will be categorised in this section. In-
vestors in the LDB dataset tilt their portfolios towards stocks with small
cap-size relative to a value-weighted market portfolio, as found in Barber
and Odean (2000). But a great majority of their positions are still in large
cap stocks, by both count and dollar value.
Using cap-size information from the CRSP stock file, all stocks traded in
the LDB dataset are assigned to a cap-size quintile. Note that the quintiles
are defined using all stocks in the CRSP database and not just those traded
in the LDB dataset. Cap-size information is updated annually in the CRSP
database, hence the quintile a stock is in can change during the course of
the data period. At any one time, roughly 70% of the total value of LDB
investors’ common stock positions is held in stocks that are in the largest
cap-size quintile i.e. the largest 20% of stocks. This decreases to 10% for
22
Capitalization quintile DE score
1 3.3
2 2.4
3 2.1
4 1.76
5 1.40
Table 1.1: Disposition effect score for positions in stocks which are in each
capitalization size quintile. Quintile 1 contains stocks with the lowest capi-
talization sizes and quintile 5 those with the highest.
the next quintile and roughly halves thereafter for each remaining quintile.
Any aggregate pattern such as the DE will therefore mostly be due to what
investors are doing with their positions of large cap stocks.
A DE score can be calculated for each cap-size quintile by summing the DE
components recorded for positions in stocks that are in that quintile. The
results of these calculations are shown in table 1.1. There is a clear decrease
in DE as cap-size increases, with the smallest stocks in terms of cap-size
having a DE that is twice that of the largest cap-size stocks. This result is
in agreement with those in Kumar (2009b), which show that more volatile
stocks tend to have a stronger DE as a group, and volatility decreases with
cap-size. These results and those of Kumar both contradict an earlier paper
on the topic by Ranguelova (2001), which also uses the LDB dataset and
finds the exact opposite: that the DE is stronger for stocks with larger
cap-size. An Odean-type score was used there too, but with some different
choices made about what exactly is counted. However, an attempt to follow
the methodology set out by Ranguelova as closely as possible still produced
the same result, that the DE is weaker for larger cap-size stocks. The reason
for the discrepancy remains unknown.
These scores can also be broken down into monthly time series as was done
in the previous section. Figure 1.5 shows a monthly series for the largest
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Figure 1.5: Monthly time series of the disposition effect for stocks in the top
20% of the cap-size distribution (updated annually) and separately for all
other stocks.
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cap-size quintile and one for the other 80% of stocks grouped together. The
series for the largest cap-size quintile is essentially the same as the series
for all stocks in figure 1.1. But the DE score for smaller cap stocks is
consistently higher, most notably in the last two years. Although there is
a fall starting in mid ’95 that mirrors that of the largest cap-size quintile,
it was at an unusually high level at the start of the year and rebounded to
a level comparable with the rest of the series in ’96, whereas the large cap
series stayed low.
Figure 1.6: The number of sales for a gain and a loss each month across all
stocks in the bottom 80% of the cap-size distribution.
As with the DE score, the series for the number of sales made for a gain
or loss, and the number of gain or loss days where a stock was not sold are
again very similar to the aggregates (in Figures 1.3 and 1.4) for the large cap
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Figure 1.7: The number of gain and loss days each month for stocks in the
bottom 80% of the cap-size distribution.
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group. Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show the corresponding series for the smaller cap
group. Breaking it down into these components reveals that the DE score for
small cap stocks is generated in a different way to the large cap group. The
number of sales for a gain and a loss are much closer together throughout
the period, hence for there to be a DE > 1 the number of opportunities to
sell for a loss has to be much larger than the number of opportunities to
sell for a gain. The second figure shows that this is indeed the case; there
is a fall in the number of loss days during ’95, as there is in the aggregate
series, but even then it remains higher than the number of gain days. This
is a good example of something that would not be apparent looking only at
the DE score by itself.
1.5.4 The influence of individual stocks on the aggre-
gate disposition effect
Given that there is a DE in aggregate across all stocks, a next step is to
investigate the relative importance of individual stocks in producing the
aggregate effect. The component counts due to an individual stock, which
will be referred to as the stock-specific components, can be summed across
investors and used to quantify the effect that trades of the stock have on the
aggregate DE.
Measuring influence
The statistical concept of influence can be used to do this, where the param-
eter estimate is calculated with and without the observation in question and
the two resulting estimates are compared.12 In this case, the aggregate DE
score is recalculated after subtracting the stock-specific components from
12The formula used here is the same as the DFBETA measure of influence commonly
used in regression analysis. It is also related to the jackknife resampling method.
27
the aggregate totals e.g. the number of times the stock was sold for a gain
is subtracted from the total number of realized gains across all stocks. The
new DE score is then subtracted from the original, giving a measure of the
stock’s total effect on the aggregate DE. This will be referred to as the
stock’s influence on the aggregate DE, or DE influence. Recalling the for-
mula for the DE score given in 1.3, the DE influence for a stock indexed by
j is defined as
IFj = DE −DE−j
where DE is the aggregate score across all stocks and DE−j is the same score
calculated without the component counts contributed by stock j. A positive
value of DE influence means the stock makes the aggregate score larger; a
negative value means it makes it smaller. Such stocks will be labeled DE
strengthening and DE weakening respectively.
The distribution of influence across stocks is extremely uneven, and is es-
sentially zero for the majority of the 9,812 stocks traded in the dataset. The
most common reason for a stock to have near-zero influence is a low number
of positions of that stock. As noted in section 1.5.3, investment value is
highly concentrated in a small number of large cap-size stocks, with a long
tail of smaller stocks that relatively few investors hold. For stocks with few
positions, subtracting their component counts from the aggregates will not
change the DE score much, regardless of the ratios of the stock-specific com-
ponents. There will also be some stocks with a large number of positions
whose component ratios closely match the aggregate ratios, and hence will
have an influence close to zero.
Figure 1.8 plots curves through the ordered influence scores for stocks in the
bottom and top (left and right in the figure) 10% of the empirical distri-
bution. Note that one percentile contains approximately 98 stocks. Decay
in influence is very rapid in both cases as a stock moves away from the ex-
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tremes of the distribution, essentially reaching zero by the 10th and 90th
percentiles. Much of the decay happens within the first and last percentiles.
If stocks with influence scores in the top 1% are removed, the aggregate
DE score falls by 15%, and if the bottom 1% are removed, it increases by
17%.
Figure 1.8: Plots of the bottom (left) and top (right) 10% of DE influence
scores across all stocks.
Stocks can be naturally separated into three groups as a result of this struc-
ture. A small group at the top of the influence distribution which make
the aggregate DE stronger, a large group in the middle who have near-zero
influence and a small group at the bottom which make the aggregate DE
weaker. To make this categorisation formally, the stocks will be split at the
5th and 95th percentile values of the distribution of influence. The resulting
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three groups will be referred to as DE strengthening, DE weakening and DE
neutral. The decay in influence is smooth at both the top and bottom of
the distribution, hence changing the cut-off percentiles does not significantly
alter the rest of the analysis.
Capitalization and volatility
First the composition of each influence group in terms of market capital-
ization and volatility will be examined. Annual cap-size and volatility data
were obtained from the CRSP stock files, and quintile groups defined for
each of the two variables in the same way as before. As with cap-size, the
volatily quintile a stock is assigned to is updated annually using the returns
data for the previous year.
For each year, the DE influence for each stock is calculated using the stock-
specific and aggregate components for that year. Stocks are then assigned
to one of the three influence groups by splitting them at the 5th and 95th
percentiles of the year’s influence score distribution. This generates an an-
nual sequence of DE influence groups that a stock is part of during the data
period. Given that there are 9,812 stocks for which DE components can be
counted, every year the DE strengthening and DE weakening groups will
both contain 982 stocks, and the DE neutral group will contain 7,848.
Along with the influence group, the stock’s cap-size and volatility quintiles
are also recorded for each year. Across all stock-year observations which are
in a particular influence group, the percentage which were in each quintile
at the time can be calculated. Table 1.2 gives these percentages for each
combination of influence group and cap-size quintile. The stocks with the
smallest cap-sizes are in quintile 1 and the largest are in quintile 5.
In the DE weakening group, stock-year observations are heavily concentrated
in the largest cap-size quintiles; over 80% are in the two largest quintiles.
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Cap quintile DE Weakening % DE Neutral % DE Strengthening %
1 1.68 19.98 3.95
2 3.57 21.69 9.33
3 9.87 20.96 17.23
4 20.83 20.28 25.33
5 64.04 17.09 44.16
Table 1.2: Percentage of stock-year observations belonging to each DE in-
fluence group where the stock was in a certain cap-size quintile, for each of
the five quintiles. Note that the columns sum to 100 (with some allowance
for rounding), but the rows do not. This is because the quintiles are defined
based on all stocks in the CRSP database and hence the distribution across
quintiles of stocks traded in this dataset does not need to be even.
Stock-year observations in the DE strengthening group are also concentrated
in the larger cap-size quintiles, but to a lesser extent. Whilst large cap
stocks have a lower DE as a group, there is clearly an important subset that
have high influence and make the aggregate DE stronger. This would not
be evident when looking only at individual stock DE scores, or aggregate
scores for cap-size groups. In contrast to the high influence groups, the
DE neutral observations are distributed evenly across all cap-size quintiles.
This confirms that as well as low cap-size stocks with few positions, there are
also large cap stocks with low influence due to the ratios of their component
counts being close to the aggregate values.
Table 1.3 gives the corresponding percentages for the volatility quintiles.
The stocks with the lowest volatilities are in quintile 1 and those with the
highest are in quintile 5. Since volatility tends to decrease with cap-size,
stocks in quintile 5 for cap-size will often be in quintile 1 for volatility.
DE weakening stock-year observations are concentrated more in the lower
volatility quintiles, and DE strengthening observations more in the higher
volatility quintiles. However the distribution in both cases is much more
even than for cap-size, showing that there are still a range of volatilities
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Volatility quintile DE Weakening % DE Neutral % DE Strengthening %
1 29.76 16.83 7.95
2 27.22 19.36 13.78
3 21.15 21.29 18.47
4 14.83 21.56 31.18
5 7.03 20.97 28.62
Table 1.3: Percentage of stock-year observations belonging to each DE in-
fluence group where the stock was in a certain volatility quintile, for each of
the five quintiles. Note that the columns sum to 100 (with some allowance
for rounding), but the rows do not. This is because the quintiles are defined
based on all stocks in the CRSP database and hence the distribution across
quintiles of stocks traded in this dataset does not need to be even.
present in the largest cap-size quintile. The distribution across quintiles is
again very even for the DE neutral group, reflecting the much wider cross-
section of stocks which are in this group at any time. As in Section 1.5.3,
these results again provide support for the finding in Kumar (2009b) that
stocks with greater volatility have a stronger DE.
Changes from year to year
Assigning stocks to an influence group each year generates a time series of
group membership for each stock. In order to examine the movement, or
otherwise, of stocks between different influence groups, the data period is
now split into pairs of consecutive years. For each stock and pair of years, the
influence group of the stock in both years is recorded, along with information
about its cap-size and volatility. As a result of the way the influence groups
are defined, 76% of the 9,812 stocks remain in the DE neutral group for
the whole data period. But there is still movement in and out of the DE
strengthening and weakening groups each year. The pairs of years across
all stocks can be grouped based on the combination of influence groups the
stock was in during the two years.
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1st group → 2nd group % of observations
S → W 0.59
S → N 2.04
S → S 2.38
N → W 2.05
N → N 85.9
N → S 2.04
W → W 2.36
W → N 2.06
W → S 0.58
Table 1.4: The percentage of pairs of consecutive years for all stocks (49,060
in total), where the stock was in two particular DE influence groups across
the two years, for all combinations of influence groups.
Table 1.4 shows the percentage of all pairs of years per stock, 49,060 in total,
with each influence group combination. Each influence group is abbreviated
to its first letter, so for example S → N indicates the stock was in the
DE strengthening group in the first of the two years, and in the DE neutral
group the second. W→W indicates that the stock was in the DE weakening
group in both years. These results confirm that there is significant movement
between the neutral group and the two high influence groups, and even some
very large jumps between the strengthening and weakening groups.
Table 1.5 gives the mean percentage change in volatility and cap-size from
the first year to the second for each combination of influence groups. The
rows are ordered according to their mean percentage change in volatility in
order to highlight the pattern in this variable. At the top of the table are
the three group combinations where a stock switches to a group closer to the
DE weakening end of the distribution i.e. switching from the strengthening
group to the weakening or neutral groups, or from the neutral group to the
weakening group. These group combinations all have a decrease in mean
volatility to go along with their move towards more DE weakening influence
groups. The stocks that make the largest movement in this direction, from
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1st group → 2nd group Mean volatility change % Mean cap-size change %
S → W -7.44 29.87
S → N -4.92 28.4
N → W -1.11 32.5
S → S 0.01 28.34
W → N 0.12 11.29
W → W 0.66 16.0
N → N 1.06 37.09
N → S 4.1 36.06
W → S 8.52 10.52
Table 1.5: The mean change in cap-size and volatility for stocks in two
particular DE influence groups across two years, for pairs of consecutive
years across all stocks.
the strengthening straight to the weakening group also have the largest fall
in mean volatility.
At the other end of the table, the two group combinations with the greatest
increase in mean volatility are those where stocks move closer to the DE
strengthening end of the distribution, with the stocks making the largest
move again having the largest increase in volatility. Stocks moving from
the weakening to the neutral group also have a positive mean change in
volatility, but it is smaller and comparable with stocks that stay in the same
group, who all have small but positive changes in volatility.
All group combinations have a positive change in mean cap-size. This is
because stock prices were generally rising during the data period and par-
ticularly in the last two years. The fact that stocks moving from the weak-
ening to the strengthening group have the smallest increase in mean cap-size
suggests that poor performance and a large increase in volatility can make
a usually DE weakening large cap stock become DE strengthening instead.
Similarly, the row above suggests that an increase in volatility coupled with
unexpectedly strong performance can cause an otherwise low influence stock
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to switch to the DE strengthening group.
1.5.5 Summary
Existing work on individual investor trading behaviour tends to look only
at the disposition effect and the factors affecting it in cross-section, and
aggregated over a large number of investors or stocks. By decomposing
the aggregate DE into its component parts, this section has been able to
establish how the different parts interact to create changes in the DE over
time. The fall in aggregate DE during ’95 and ’96 is driven by a dramatic
decrease in the number of opportunities to sell stocks for a loss at the time.
This in turn is due to the strong performance of the stock market in ’95 and
’96, the start of a boom that culminated in the dotcom crash. Despite the
fall in the number of opportunities to sell for a loss, investors still chose to
sell a similar number of stocks for a loss as in previous years, likely due to
the desire to offset capital gains and reduce their tax burden. Hence the
proportion of losses realized increased and the disposition effect fell.
Looking at time series of the different component parts also revealed a dif-
ference between the largest 20% of stocks in terms of market capitalization,
and those in the rest of the distribution. This large cap group had a lower
DE than the rest of the stocks for most of the data period, but with consis-
tently more sales for a gain than for a loss. In contrast the smaller cap group
had roughly equal numbers of sales for a gain and a loss each month. The
lower DE for the large cap group is produced by the much greater number
of opportunities to sell these stocks for a gain than for a loss; the opposite
was true for the smaller cap stocks with many more opportunities to sell for
a loss in most months.
Decomposing the aggregate DE into the parts contributed by individual
stocks showed that a small number of stocks have extremely large influence in
terms of determining the aggregate DE, with the majority having essentially
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zero influence. Most of these high influence stocks are in the largest 20%
of stocks in terms of cap-size due to these stocks being by far the most
commonly held in the dataset. This shows that whilst smaller cap stocks
have a higher DE as a group, it is in fact a small number of stocks in the large
cap group that increase the aggregate DE by the greatest amount.
Looking at these high and low influence groups over time has shown that
stocks do move between them from year to year. Stocks which move closer to
the DE strengthening end of the distribution exhibit an increase in volatility,
whilst stocks which move in the opposite direction exhibit a decrease.
1.6 The Cox model in detail
The count-based measure of the DE used in the preceding sections was useful
for exploratory purposes and detecting aggregate patterns in the data. But
to formally test the effect of a covariate on the DE, whilst controlling for the
effect of others, a regression model is the best option. Proportional hazards
(PH) regression models are preferred to other models such as linear or logistic
regression, due to the reasons described in section 1.3.2. Hypothesising the
presence of a DE is a claim about the rate at which positions are sold,
specifically that gains are sold at a greater rate than losses. Hence modelling
this rate directly, as is done in a PH model, will provide a better framework
for testing claims about the DE. This section will introduce the Cox model, a
particular type of PH model, and discuss its use for measuring the DE.
Let λ(t,X(t)), for t > 0, be the rate at which stock positions are sold, which
shall be referred to as the hazard rate. It is dependent on the time t and the
p-dimensional vector X(t), which consists of observations on p covariates at
time t. The hazard rate, or function, is defined as
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λ(t,X(t)) = lim
h↓0
P(t 6 T < t+ h|T > t, X(t))
h
where T is the time at which the stock is sold. The hazard function is
therefore approximately the probability of the stock being sold in the in-
finitesimal period of time immediately after t, conditional on the stock not
having been sold prior to t and on the ’history’ of the covariates during the
period [0, t].
Proportional hazards (PH) models assume that the hazard rate can be split
into two components. The first, called the baseline hazard function, is com-
mon to all positions and depends only on time. The second depends on
the current values of the covariates, which may themselves depend on time.
The key assumption of PH models is that changes in the covariates have a
multiplicative effect on the baseline hazard, and that this effect is constant
over time. Checking this assumption will be an important part of the anal-
ysis presented below. In such models, the hazard function can be written
as
λ(t,X(t), β) = λ0(t) exp(β
>X(t)) (1.4)
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function, and β is a p-dimensional vector
of coefficients. Fully parametric PH models specify a functional form for the
baseline hazard function and estimate its parameters along with β. However,
there may not be a good basis for choosing one particular form over another.
Cox et al. (1972) proposed a method for estimating β whilst leaving the
baseline hazard function unspecified. Since the effect of covariates is of
primary interest and there is no strong reason for choosing a particular form
for the baseline hazard, the Cox model will be used throughout this chapter.
Estimation of the Cox model involves maximizing the ’partial likelihood’
that depends only on β, given by
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lp(β) =
n∏
i=1
(
exp[β>Xi(Ti)]∑
j∈R(Ti) exp[β
>Xj(Ti)]
)ci
(1.5)
where n is the number of positions across all investors, and ci and R(Ti) are
the censoring indicator and risk set - concepts from survival analysis that
will be explained in the following. Positions are under observation for a set
period of time after being purchased, called the follow-up time. If a position
has not been sold by the end of its follow-up time, then it is said to be
censored. A position is also censored if it has not been sold by the end of
the data period. In (1.5), Ti is the time that position i is sold or censored.
The censoring indicator ci equals one if the position is sold at time Ti and
zero if it is censored. R(Ti) is the risk set, containing all positions that have
not been sold or censored prior to time Ti, including position i itself. Hence
censored positions only contribute to the likelihood by their presence in risk
sets at times when other positions are sold.13
The follow up time used in the analysis below and in chapter 2 is 500 days.
This decision was made because for longer holding periods it becomes less
likely that the investor is actively considering selling the position, and the
position is therefore not informative about the effect of covariates on the
decision to sell. Related to this is the time scale that is being used to
record a position’s holding period and how this impacts the risk set that
is constructed when the position is sold or censored. The holding period
is defined as the time in days since the stock was first purchased. As a
consequence of this, the risk set of positions contributing to the denominator
in (1.5) are those that had been held for the same amount of time as the
position which was sold. Hence positions in the risk set did not necessarily
exist at the same calendar time as the sold stock, but did exist at the same
13This formula ignores the possibility of tied event times, which occur in this dataset
when two or more positions are sold on the same day. The method proposed in Efron
(1977) is used to approximate the likelihood contribution for a time point when there are
multiple events.
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’follow-up time’. This means that calendar effects, such as whether the
hazard of selling is greater in December months, can be tested through the
inclusion of dummy variables in the model.
The log of the likelihood in (1.5) is twice-differentiable and can therefore be
maximised using the Newton-Raphson algorithm. Standard errors for the
parameter estimates are obtained as the inverse of the information matrix,
which is minus the second derivative of the likelihood for β.
In a Cox model for the hazard rate of a position being sold, the DE can be
defined as follows. let X1(t) be an indicator function which equals one if the
market price of the stock at t is greater than or equal to the price the stock
was purchased at, and zero otherwise. Let β1 be the regression coefficient
associated with X1(t). Then there is a DE if β1 > 0, as this implies that the
position trading at a gain increases the hazard of it being sold, relative to
if it were trading at a loss. Often the hazard ratio, defined as exp(β1), will
be used to summarise the effect of a covariate, as it gives the proportional
change in hazard for a one unit change in the covariate. Once a Cox model
has been estimated, the presence of a DE can be tested formally using the
Wald test statistic
z =
βˆ1
ŜE(βˆ1)
which asymptotically has the standard normal distribution.
1.7 Measuring the disposition effect in the
LDB dataset using a Cox model
This section will estimate a simple Cox model using the LDB data in order
to demonstrate this method for measuring the DE. The formation of the
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dataset used for model estimation will be discussed in detail, along with the
choices made regarding the definition of the holding period of a position.
After the model has been estimated, a method for checking the proportional
hazards assumption will be described.
1.7.1 Sample formation
Positions are defined and recorded as follows. A position starts when an
investor purchases a stock they do not already hold. There is information
on the stocks an investor holds at the start of the data period, but not the
purchase date or price, hence these pre-existing positions cannot be included,
and are ignored for the purpose of determining if a stock purchase marks
the start of a new position or not. If an investor purchases more of a stock
they already hold, the quantity held and share-weighted average purchase
price are updated accordingly. A position ends when the stock is sold. If
only part of the quantity held is sold, the position is still considered to have
ended on that date and will be entered into the dataset as such. This is
because the holding period and reference price (the price used to determine
if a position is trading at a gain or not, and if a sale was for a gain or not)
after the first sale are ambiguous.
If a partial sale has occurred, the quantity held is still tracked and a new
position in this stock cannot start until after the entire quantity held has
been sold. There are some cases where a sale is made for a greater quantity
of stock than was observed being purchased, due to the investor already
holding some of the stock before the start of the data period. In these
cases the sale is not considered valid for the purposes of this sample and the
quantity held is set to zero. A subsequent purchase of the stock will start a
new position as usual.
The other way a position can end is by being censored if it is not sold
before the end of the 500 day follow up period. In the LDB dataset, 83%
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of positions are sold before the end of this 500 day follow up period. A
position can also be censored if a sale has not been observed before the end
of the data period, which is November 29th, 1996. In the LDB dataset there
are approximately 618,500 valid positions according to the criteria set out
above. They are held by 55,300 unique investors and 70% are sold before
being censored, for a total of 436,100 sales.
On each day during the holding period of a position, including the day it
is sold or censored but not the day it is purchased, the paper status of the
position is recorded. Following Odean (1998) The position is trading at a
gain if the daily low price is above the average purchase price, at a loss if
the daily high price is below the average purchase price, and is considered
’neutral’ otherwise.14
1.7.2 Model results
Table 1.6 shows the results from fitting a Cox model to the set of positions
extracted as described in the previous section. Note that all of the Cox mod-
els in this chapter and the next were estimated using the ’survival’ package
in R.15 The sole covariate is a categorical variable indicating the current
paper status of the position, with levels ’gain’, ’loss’, and ’neutral’. The
’loss’ category is the reference level. The hazard ratio for the gain indica-
tor is 1.80, meaning that positions trading at a gain have an 80% increased
hazard of being sold relative to positions trading at a loss. Paper neutral
stocks have a 6% increased hazard of being sold relative to losses. Both
parameter estimates have highly significant Wald statistics, as indicated by
the reported p-values. These results therefore confirm the basic finding that
there is a strong DE in this dataset.
14On the date of a sale the sell price is used for this comparison, so a stock sold for a
gain will always be recorded as having been trading at a gain on that date, and likewise
with losses.
15Therneau (2015)
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Variable HR P-value
Paper status: Gain 1.80 < 0.001
Paper status: Neutral 1.06 < 0.001
Table 1.6: Parameter estimates resulting from fitting a Cox model to po-
sitions in the LDB dataset, reported as hazard ratios (HR), and p-values
for Wald tests of the estimates being different from zero (or equivalently for
HRs, being different from 1).
1.7.3 Testing the proportional hazards assumption
The most important implication of the proportional hazards (PH) assump-
tion is that the effect of a covariate is constant throughout the follow-up
period. With the above model results, this means that the hazard of a po-
sition being sold is 80% greater if it is trading at a gain rather than a loss,
regardless of how long the position has already been held. Whilst violation
of the assumption does not invalidate the model, it does significantly alter
the interpretation, particularly when only hazard ratios are reported. If an
effect does change over time then the hazard ratio is only an average of this
process, and if it changes a lot then this average can be misleading. Despite
its importance, authors using PH models in the literature generally do not
report having checked the assumption. In an effort to correct this, checking
the PH assumption will be a particular focus when models that make it are
used in this and the following chapter.
This will be done with a method that makes use of the residual process
for Cox models suggested by Schoenfeld (1982).16 The derivative of the log
partial likelihood w.r.t βk, the coefficient corresponding to the k-th covariate,
is
16The derivation followed here is from Hosmer Jr et al. (2011), modified to accommodate
the inclusion of time-dependent covariates.
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∂Lp(β)
∂βk
=
n∑
i=1
ci [zik(Ti)− z¯k(Ti)] (1.6)
where ci is the censoring indicator, zik denotes the value of the k-th param-
eter for the i-th unit and
z¯k(Ti) =
∑
j∈R(Ti) zjk(Ti) exp[β
>Zj(Ti)]∑
j∈R(Ti) exp[β
>Zj(Ti)]
Substituting in the partial likelihood estimator βˆ in place of β produces the
estimator of the Schoenfeld residual for the i-th unit on the k-th covari-
ate
sˆik = ci[zik(Ti)− ˆ¯zk(Ti)] (1.7)
The residual sˆik can be interpreted as the difference between the value of
covariate k for the i-th unit at the time that it fails Ti, and the weighted
average of covariate k values for all units still in the risk set at time Ti
(which includes unit i). The weight for unit j is given by the ’risk score’
exp[βˆ>Zj(Ti)] i.e. a measure of how likely the unit was to fail at time Ti,
relative to other units in the risk set, as estimated by the model.
A violation of the PH assumption implies that the true parameter βk is not
constant and is in fact a function of time, i.e. βk(t). Suppose that this
is the case, but a standard Cox model is fitted to the data, producing the
parameter estimate βˆk. Grambsch and Therneau (1994) show that
E(s?ik) ≈ βk(Ti)− βˆk
Where s?ik is the scaled Schoenfeld residual, defined as the k-th component
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of the scaled vector17
s?i = [V̂ar(sˆi)]
−1sˆi
Hence the PH assumption can be assessed for covariate k by plotting s?ik+ βˆk
against each residual’s respective failure time and adding a smoothed line
through the points. A non-zero slope in this line indicates non-proportional
hazards, with a positive slope implying the hazard ratio for this covariate
increases over time and a negative slope implying that it decreases. It may
be the case that PH is only violated during a certain period of time, and
holds for the remainder.
Figure 1.9 shows this plot for the paper gain indicator in the model estimated
in section 1.7.2. Since there are a very large number of events, and therefore
residuals, only the smoothed line and a 95% confidence interval for it are
plotted. Note that the event times plotted on the x-axis have undergone a
transform recommended by the R ’survival’ package author in order to assure
an even spread of points across the axis i.e. intervals with fewer events,
such as at the end of the data period, appear shortened. The downward
slope starting after 100 days indicates that the DE becomes weaker after
this point, meaning there is less of a difference between gains and losses in
terms of the hazard of them being sold. This is an important caveat to the
conclusion that there is a DE in this dataset, and one that would not have
been detected had the PH assumption not been checked.
17In fact, [V̂ar(sˆi)]
−1 is usually approximated by mV̂ar(βˆ), where m is the total number
of events, since it is easier to compute. All mentions of scaled Schoenfeld residuals in the
remainder of this thesis refer to approximate residuals calculated in this way.
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Figure 1.9: A plot of a smoothed curve fitted to the scaled Schoenfeld resid-
uals for the paper gain indicator, with a dashed line at the level of the
coefficient estimate β.
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1.8 Connection with count-based measures
of the disposition effect
The previous section used a Cox model to estimate the difference in the rate
at which gains and losses are sold i.e. the hazard ratio for the paper gain
indicator. The ratio PGR/PLR, introduced in section 1.4 and used through-
out section 1.5, has a qualitatively similar interpretation. This section will
formalise the relationship between the two quantities.
The hazard ratio can also be estimated non-parametrically using a formula
proposed in Peto and Peto (1972)
ĤR =
(
OG
EG
/
OL
EL
)
(1.8)
where OG and OL are the total number of sales observed for a gain and loss
respectively. EG is the number of sales for a gain that would be expected if
there was no difference between the rate at which gains and losses are sold,
and is defined by
EG =
k∑
i=1
mi
Ri
NGi
where i = 1, ..., k are the unique event times, mi is the number of sales that
occurred at time i, NGi is the number of positions trading for a gain at time
i and Ri is the total number of positions that were at risk of being sold at
time i.18 EL is defined similarly. The ’observed’ and ’expected’ quantities,
O and E, are the same as those from the log-rank statistic for testing the
equality of two survival curves. Note that for simplicity it is being assumed
18For a large dataset such as this, there is at least one event on each day of the follow
up period, so sums over the unique event times are effectively sums over the days of the
follow up period.
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that a position must be either trading for a gain or a loss at all times during
its holding period.
From the definition of the terms in formulas (1.1) and (1.2), PGR and PLR
can be re-expressed using the variables from (1.8)
PGR =
OG
NG
, PLR =
OL
NL
where
NG =
k∑
i=1
NGi
and likewise for NL. Now the Odean ratio from (1.3) can be written as
DE =
(
OG
NG
/
OL
NL
)
(1.9)
Dividing the hazard ratio estimator in (1.8) by this quantity produces a
scaling factor that does not depend on the observed counts OG and OL
ĤR
DE
=
OGELOLNG
OLEGOGNL
=
ELNG
EGNL
(1.10)
This implies that ĤR > DE if
ELNG
EGNL
> 1
or equivalently
EL
NL
>
EG
NG
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Meaning the hazard ratio will be greater in magnitude than the modified
Odean score if the ratio of the expected number of sales to the total number
of positions in the risk set (summed across the unique event times) is greater
for losses than it is for gains.
To demonstrate this relationship, the scaling factor derived in (1.10) can be
calculated for the LDB dataset and applied to the DE score produced using
the sample of positions collected as described in section 1.7.1. Due to the
derivation above using the restriction that a position must be in either the
paper gain or paper loss category at all times, intervals where a position
is in the paper neutral category are recoded as paper losses. Estimating a
Cox model produces a hazard ratio for the gain indicator of 1.78. The DE
score for this sample is 1.57, and the scaling factor is 1.12. This produces
an estimate of the hazard ratio of 1.76. The remaining discrepancy is likely
due to the downward bias of ĤR in large samples with tied event times, as
discussed in Bernstein et al. (1981).19
19Note that ĤR is equivalent to their O/E estimator since for this dataset all tables
are informative i.e. there are gain and loss positions at risk at all time points.
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Chapter 2
Using a frailty model to
measure the effect of covariates
on the disposition effect
2.1 Introduction
An important aim in the DE literature has been to determine which factors
either strengthen or weaken the effect, particularly the characteristics of the
investors themselves. Starting with Feng and Seasholes (2005), the use of a
proportional hazards regression model, introduced in section 1.6, has been
a common approach to this problem. In the context of survival analysis,
an important property of trading record datasets is the natural grouping
of trades at the investor level. Positions held by the same investor are
likely to be dependent due the particular investment style of the investor,
and this unobserved heterogeneity needs to be addressed when estimating a
regression model. The problem of investor-level dependency is made more
important by the extreme imbalance that can be present in datasets of this
kind. A small number of investors account for a large proportion of overall
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trading activity, hence effect estimates will disproportionately reflect the
idiosyncrasies of these investors if no effort is made to control for them.
In the existing literature the marginal method is used, which adjusts stan-
dard errors after the model has been estimated to account for the investor-
level correlation between positions. This chapter will explore the use of
frailty models as an alternative. The analysis will again make use of the LDB
dataset, which was introduced in section 1.2. In a frailty model, the propen-
sity to sell a position that is unique to each investor is modelled directly in
a way that is analogous to the use of random effects in linear regression.
For the dataset used here, the addition of a frailty component significantly
improves upon the equivalent marginal model and allows a greater number
of effects to be significantly estimated. In addition, the frailty model adheres
much more closely to the proportional hazards assumption, which makes the
parameter estimates more useful as summaries of the effect over time.
Results from the frailty model provide some new evidence on experience
and learning; the number of trades an investor has made does not have
a significant effect on the DE when the investor’s self-assessed experience
level is included in the model, and the length of time an investor has held
an account does not appear to be a reliable measure of experience in this
dataset, as those who opened an account most recently exhibit the weakest
DE. Graphical checking of the proportional hazards assumption adds nuance
to the interpretation of some variables. For example, the weakening of the
DE in December is much larger for positions that have already been held for
a long period of time, and differences in the DE between positions in small
and large cap-size stocks only start to materialize after they have been held
for roughly 100 days.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 dis-
cusses the problem of investor-level correlation in detail, along with both the
marginal and frailty approaches to dealing with with. Section 2.3 describes
the covariates that will be used for model estimation. Section 2.5 presents
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results from estimating both a frailty and marginal model, and highlights
how they differ. Section 2.6 presents some additional models that check the
robustness of the main results. Section 2.7 summarises the advantages that
using a frailty model provided for this analysis and compares the results to
those in the literature.
2.2 The problem of correlation
Datasets of brokerage trading records are naturally grouped at the investor
level. In models where the observational units are stock positions, the pos-
sibility of dependence between positions held by the same investor needs
to be addressed. Survival models for the lifetimes of stock positions are a
popular method for measuring the disposition effect (DE) and factors that
may affect its severity, hence investor-level correlation is an important issue
in empirical work on the DE. In the existing literature, the marginal model
approach has been used, where standard errors that are robust to correla-
tion between positions are calculated after the model has been estimated.1
2
This chapter will explore the use of frailty models as an alternative, where
investor-level correlation is modelled explicitly through the use of latent
variables. This method is analogous to the use of random effects in linear
regression. Frailty models make assumptions about the structure of depen-
1Marginal models encompass a wider set of strategies for dealing with complex survival
data, but for models of stock position lifetimes, the marginal approach only requires the
calculation of robust standard errors.
2Ivkovic et al. (2005) deal with the issue of correlation caused by unobserved hetero-
geneity by stratifying the model based on the investor that held the position. This means
each investor has a different baseline hazard function, which can absorb any heterogeneity
not captured by the model covariates. However, this approach precludes the inclusion of
covariates that are fixed at the investor-level, such as gender, since the variable only takes
on a single value within each strata and a coefficient cannot be estimated. Hence, whilst
effective, this approach cannot be adopted here due to the importance of demographic
information in the analysis.
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dence within and between groups of positions, whereas no such assumptions
are made in the marginal approach. However if these assumptions are rea-
sonable then using a frailty model will provide a number of advantages over
the corresponding marginal model. This section will describe the different
modifications that are made to the basic Cox model, as introduced in section
1.6, to produce the marginal and frailty models. The differences between
the two methods in practice will then be discussed.3
2.2.1 Marginal model
In the marginal approach, all positions are assumed to be independent for
the purpose of estimating β, the vector of model coefficients. Estimation
proceeds in the same way as the standard Cox model, with robust standard
errors being calculated afterwards. Lin and Wei (1989) derive an estimator
for the variance of βˆ in the familiar ’sandwich’ form that is consistent in
the presence of correlation between groups of units, in this case correlation
between positions held by the same investor. Lipsitz et al. (1996) provide
an estimator that is asymptotically equivalent to that of Lin and Wei, but
easier to compute in practice using an infinitesimal jackknife method.
After a Cox model has been estimated, positions are split into q groups, one
for each investor. The jackknife residual for group j is
Jj = βˆ − βˆ−j
where βˆ−j is the vector of parameter estimates resulting from fitting the
same model but after deleting the observations in group j. Fitting a new
model for every group would be very costly, so instead β˜−j, an approxima-
tion of βˆ−j, is computed in the following way. Estimate βˆ by letting the
3For a more detailed discussion of the theoretical and practical differences between
marginal and frailty models, see Wienke (2010).
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Newton-Raphson algorithm run until convergence as usual, then run it for
another step after deleting the observations in group j, producing β˜−j. The
approximate jackknife variance estimate is then(
q − p
q
) q∑
j=1
(β˜−j − βˆ)(β˜−j − βˆ)′
where p is the number of parameters being estimated. In the model esti-
mated in section 2.5 the robust standard errors are significantly larger than
their naive counterparts, but in general they can be larger or smaller.
2.2.2 Frailty model
In contrast to a marginal model, frailty models assume a specific structure for
the dependence between positions held by the same investor and incorporate
it in the model directly. Specifically, a shared frailty model can be used where
each investor is assumed to have a certain propensity for selling positions
they hold. Conditional on this shared frailty and the model covariates, the
survival times of positions held by the same investor are assumed to be
independent. Similarly, the effect of covariates on the survival of positions
held by different investors is assumed to be constant, conditional on the
investor-specific frailties.
These investor-level frailties are included in the Cox model as fixed quantities
that act multiplicatively on the baseline hazard function. In a shared frailty
model for position lifetimes with j = 1, ..., q investors and i = 1, ..., nj posi-
tions associated with each investor, the hazard function for the i-th position
of the j-th investor is
λij(t) = Zjλ0(t) exp(β
>Xij(t))
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Where Xij is the covariate vector for the position and Zj the unobserved
frailty associated with investor j. The vector of frailties Z are assumed to
be random variables with a common distribution, the parameters of which
can be estimated. The gamma distribution is a common choice of frailty
distribution, and is the one that will be used here. As discussed in Wienke
(2010), the gamma distribution is used as a frailty distribution primarily
because of its mathematical properties: it produces non-negative values, it
can flexibly model a variety of distributional ’shapes’ as its variance changes
and the simplicity of its Laplace transform means the frailty terms can be
easily integrated out of the log partial likelihood in the Cox model.
Since a scaling factor common to the frailties of all subjects can be absorbed
into the baseline hazard of the Cox model, the gamma distribution for the
frailties is taken to have expectation equal to one. Hence only the variance
of the frailty distribution must be estimated as an additional parameter.
Testing whether this variance is significantly different from zero is the pri-
mary way of establishing if investors do indeed have differing levels of frailty
when it comes to selling positions they hold.
Derivations of the partial log-likelihood for a Cox model with gamma frail-
ties are provided by Klein (1992) and Nielsen et al. (1992). As with many
latent variable problems the EM algorithm can be used in this situation, as
described by these references. In the R ’survival’ package4, which is used
here, the problem is placed in the framework of penalised regression. When
gamma frailties are used, this approach produces the same estimates as the
EM algorithm, as shown in Therneau and Grambsch (2000). The package
authors report from experience that this implementation typically converges
significantly faster than an equivalent EM implementation. Details of the
estimation procedure can also be found in this reference, and in the docu-
mentation accompanying the ’survival’ package.
4See Therneau (2015) for some detail.
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Shared frailty is a natural fit for investor trading data since there are a large
number of investors and variation at the investor level is more of a nuisance
factor that could obscure the effects of covariates in the model, which are
the main focus of the analysis. Grouping variables can also be included as
fixed effects, for example gender divides the data into two groups and is
included in the models estimated later in the chapter. But this would not
be feasible for investors since there are thousands of them and many have
as little as one position in the dataset. Additionally, there is no need to test
hypotheses about differences between specific investors, it is sufficient to have
an estimate of the variation between investors in general, as is provided in
the frailty model.
Possible reasons for there being such a difference between investors include
their preference for risk, their beliefs about the market (e.g. whether there
is price momentum or not), their investment objectives and the particular
strategy they are following. For example, some more serious investors may
trade very frequently and follow a strategy based on short term changes in
stock prices. The holding periods of these investors will therefore be shorter
than other investors in the sample. Shared frailty can separate out this kind
of difference from the effects of covariates included in the model, that are in
theory common across all investors.
2.2.3 Comparison
Because of the assumptions each model makes, the interpretation of pa-
rameter estimates is different in marginal and frailty models (note that any
reference to a frailty model will from now on mean specifically a shared
frailty model). Marginal models estimate average effects at the population
level, with the average being across all investors. Hence the coefficient of a
covariate describes the expected difference in survival for positions that differ
in this covariate, regardless of which investors hold the positions. In a frailty
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model, a coefficient describes the difference in hazard between two positions
that differ in the covariate, conditional on the frailties of the investors.
Since the marginal model is estimating effects averaged across all investors,
the estimates can be biased if the sample either contains positions from only
a small number of investors, or the distribution of positions across investors
in the sample is very imbalanced. The former problem is not relevant in
this dataset since over 5,000 investors are represented in the sample used for
estimating the models in section 2.5.5 The latter is more of a concern though
since the sample is extremely imbalanced in terms of positions per investor.
The median number of positions per investor is 7, whilst the maximum is
451 and investors in the top decile of this distribution account for 46% of
the total number of positions. If the survival of positions is correlated at the
investor level, then coefficient estimates that ignore this, as in a marginal
model, will disproportionately reflect the behaviour of these most active
investors. By separating the coefficient estimates out from each investor’s
static propensity for selling positions, the frailty model can provide a more
accurate summary of the effect a covariate has on the hazard of selling.
Another advantage of frailty models is their ability to explain apparent vio-
lations of the PH assumption when effects appear to weaken over the course
of the follow-up time. Positions that remain unsold for a long time are more
likely to be held by investors with a lower propensity for selling i.e. frailty,
hence the effect of all covariates seems weaker for positions that have been
held for a long time when differing levels of frailty are not accounted for. This
is more apparent when the follow-up time is long since there is more scope
for observing longer survival times. The follow up time here is 500 days,
compared to the median holding period of 86 days for positions where a sale
is observed, so this will be a relevant issue. Effects that weaken over time
can be detected using the Schoenfeld residuals, as discussed in Section 1.7.3.
5A small number of groups would suggest that the grouping variable should be included
using fixed effects, rather than as a frailty term.
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The results of section 2.5 show that for this dataset, adding frailty terms
greatly improves the model’s adherence to the PH assumption.
If shared frailty is a good description of the dependence structure in the
data, then adding a frailty component will produce a more useful model
for the reasons described above. In particular it will help isolate the effects
of covariates in the model and their interactions, which is the main aim in
analyses of the disposition effect. Assessing whether the addition of frailties
does improve the model will be the focus of section 2.5.
2.3 Covariates
This section contains a description of the covariates that will be included
in the model. Their effect on the DE will also be tested through the use of
interaction terms. Following previous work on the topic, primarily Feng and
Seasholes (2005) (F&S) and Dhar and Zhu (2006) (D&Z), many of them are
related to the hypothesis that more sophisticated and experienced investors
suffer less from the DE. Some stock-level variables will also be tested. Since
the dataset is large, it should be possible to significantly estimate even small
effects. This analysis again makes use of the LDB dataset, which was in-
troduced in section 1.2. The LDB dataset was also used by D&Z in their
analysis.
• Paper status: this variable records whether the position is currently
trading at a gain (daily low and high prices above the purchase price),
loss (daily low and high prices below the average purchase price) or
neither. This third state shall be referred to as paper neutral. If
positions in the paper gain group have a greater hazard of being sold
than those in the paper loss category, then there is a DE. The paper loss
category is used as the reference level, hence the model will contain an
indicator for whether the position is paper neutral rather than a paper
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loss, and one for whether it is a paper gain rather than a paper loss.
This latter indicator measures the strength of the DE, as discussed in
section 1.6.
• Gender: coded as an indicator which equals one if the investor is male.
92% of investors are male, but significant differences between genders
have been found in the LDB dataset. Barber and Odean (2001a) find
that men trade 45% more than women and that their net return is
roughly one percentage point lower per year as a result. However F&S
note that, in a different dataset, gender only appears important in
explaining the propensity to sell when few other control variables are
included. Since a number of controls are being included here, further
evidence on the importance of gender can be found.
• Age: the investor’s age, as recorded on June 8 1997, 7 months after
the end of the data period.
• Professional occupation indicator: whether the investor works in a
professional occupation or not. The category is labelled as ’profes-
sional/technical’, and contains 42% of investors. The remaining in-
vestors are in categories such as ’administrative/managerial’, ’sales/service’,
’clerical/white collar’ or are retired. D&Z find that investors who work
in professional occupations exhibit a disposition effect that is 20%
weaker than those who work in non-professional occupations.
• Income: provided by the brokerage house is a proxy for income that is
not continuous yet contains a large number of categories. This variable
was therefore converted to a categorical variable by splitting it into
quartiles. The four groups shall be referred to as the ’low’, ’medium’,
’high’ and ’very high’ income groups. D&Z find that high-income
investors exhibit a DE 10% smaller than low income investors.
• Self-assessed experience: When opening an account, investors were
asked to describe their investing experience on a four point scale. The
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levels are ’None’, ’Limited’, ’Good’, and ’Extensive’.
• Tenure: the time in (possibly fractional) years since the investor opened
their first account at the brokerage, recorded at the start of the data
period. Negative values occur when an investor opened their first
account after the start of the data period, as is the case for 12% of
investors. Tenure is included as a measure of ’passive’ experience, with
the theory being that more experience investors will suffer less from
the DE. The variable is split into four groups based on the bins defined
by (-1, 1], (1, 4], (4, 8] and (8, 16]. Note that the maximum recorded
value is 15.8 years. These groups will be referred to as Tenure 1-4, in
the same order.
• Initial Diversification: The number of stocks the investor holds, across
all their accounts, in the first month for which they have a record in the
dataset. This variable is split into bins defined by (0,3], (3,7], (7,12]
and (12, ∞), and the groups will be referred to as Diversification 1-
4. F&S find that investors with greater initial portfolio diversification
suffer less from the DE.
• Number of sales made to date: a time-varying covariate that only
includes sales where the purchase occurred after the start of the data
period. This variable is highly skewed, so its natural logarithm will be
used when estimating models, as has been done in past research. F&S
and D&Z find that having completed more sales reduces an investor’s
DE, implying that investors learn from their mistakes.
• Capitalization quintile of the stock: this data is taken from CRSP and
is a time-varying covariate since it is updated annually. Quintile 1
contains stocks with the smallest cap-size, and quintile 5 those with
the largest. The analysis in section 1.5.1 found that positions in stocks
from higher cap-size quintiles exhibited a lower DE. Larger cap-size
stocks have lower volatility, hence this finding is consistent with Kumar
59
(2009b), who finds that lower volatility stocks exhibit less of a DE.
For each cap-size quintile, table 2.3 gives the percentage of holding
days across all positions for which the stock held was in that quintile.
Quintile 5 was used as the reference level for this variable in the models
below, to increase the chance of finding significant differences between
groups.
Cap-size quintile 1 2 3 4 5
% of holding days 2.29 4.77 8.14 14.45 70.35
• SIC major group: also from CRSP, this variable separates stocks into
one of 10 industry groups. These are described in table 2.3, which also
gives the percentage of positions due to stocks in each of the groups.
This variable is included mainly as a control for possible correlation
between positions in similar stocks. The manufacturing group (MAN)
was used as the reference level for this variable.
SIC major group Group label % of positions
Agriculture, forestry & fishing AFF 0.03
Construction CON 0.57
Finance, insurance & real-estate FIRE 8.52
Manufacturing MAN 48.64
Mining MIN 3.81
Public administration PUBA 0.13
Retail trade RETL 7.82
Services SERV 12.29
Transport & public utility TRAN 9.75
Wholesale trade WHOL 2.46
• December indicator: equalling one for intervals of the position’s hold-
ing period which are in December, and is hence time-varying. Due to
the ending of the tax year, trading behaviour is significantly different
in December. Odean (1998) finds that the DE is actually reversed for
December months, which is known as the December effect. This ef-
fect was found in section 1.5.1, although with some variation between
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years. Including it in the model here may provide some more evidence
on the topic.
• 1995/96 indicator: equalling one for intervals of the position’s holding
period which are in years 1995 or 1996. Analysis in section 1.5.1 showed
that the aggregate DE decreases significantly in 1995/96, the last two
years of the data period. Controlling for this effect will therefore be
important when trying to isolate the effect of other variables.
For fitting the models described in the following sections, the sample was
restricted to only those investors and positions for which full information
was available on all covariates described in the previous section. This leaves
a sample of 5,577 investors who hold 84,975 positions. Missing demographic
information accounts for the majority of excluded positions. In fact, 70%
of all positions observed in the dataset are held by an investor without oc-
cupation information, 50% each by investors without gender information or
self-assessed experience, and 40% by investors without age information. The
effect these variables have on the DE is of primary interest, so it will still
be worthwhile to fit models using this heavily reduced sample. However a
model without these variables will be estimated using a much larger sam-
ple in section 3.6.4. Parameter estimates for variables that appear in both
models can then be compared to see if using the reduced sample makes a sig-
nificant difference. The remainder of this section and those that follow shall
deal exclusively with the reduced sample unless otherwise specified.
Of the 84,975 positions in the reduced sample, 60.4% are sold within 500 days
of first being purchased, with the remainder being censored at that time. As
discussed in section 1.7.1, only the first sale of a position is recorded, since
the holding period and reference price of subsequent sales is ambiguous. The
median holding period is 155 days, and 86 days if censored observations are
not included.
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2.4 Summary statistics
Min. Median Mean Max.
Age 24.00 48.00 50.53 92.00
Tenure (years) -0.75 3.78 3.99 15.81
Diversification (# stocks) 1.00 3.00 4.98 269.00
Total sales 0.00 3.00 10.09 470.00
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for the continuous covariates. Calculated
across investors, rather than positions, and only including investors with
at least one position in the sample that will be used for model estimation.
Diversification is the number of stocks the investor had in their portfolio in
the first month for which there is a record of their positions.
Table 2.1 presents some summary statistics, at the investor level, for the
continuous variables that will be used in the modelling to follow. Note
that negative values of the tenure variable indicate that the investor opened
their first account at the brokerage after the start of the data period, at the
beginning of 1991. Most of note is the large range and skewness present
in the measure of diversification (number of stocks present in the investor’s
accounts in the first month for which there is a record) and the total number
of sales each investor makes. The latter will enter into any model as a
time-varying covariate, taking the value of the current total. As mentioned
in section 2.3, diversification is split into a categorical variable with four
groups, and the log of number of sales made is used.
For the categorical variables, table 2.2 gives the percentage of investors and
positions in each category, along with the latter divided by the former. This
highlights groups of investors which hold a disproportionate number of posi-
tions. Investors who describe their experience as extensive and investors in
the highest income quartile hold 40% and 60% more positions respectively
than would be expected if all investors held the mean number of positions
i.e. if there were no differences between groups. This shows the imbalance
in the distribution of positions across investors, and again highlights the im-
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% of investors % of positions Ratio (Pos/Inv)
Female 8.01 6.73 0.84
Male 91.99 93.27 1.01
Non-professional 57.48 57.11 0.99
Professional 42.52 42.89 1.01
Income 1 31.53 27.46 0.87
Income 2 30.95 27.48 0.89
Income 3 25.75 28.78 1.12
Income 4 11.77 16.29 1.38
Experience: None 3.31 2.48 0.75
Experience: Limited 35.42 24.54 0.69
Experience: Good 47.35 51.01 1.08
Experience: Extensive 13.93 21.97 1.58
Table 2.2: Distribution of categorical variables across investors and posi-
tions. The ratio is the percentage of positions divided by the percentage of
investors. Income has been split into quartiles, with quartile 1 containing
those with the lowest incomes. Experience is self-reported by the investor.
portance of controlling for investor-level correlation between positions.
2.5 Comparison of marginal and frailty mod-
els
Following Feng and Seasholes (2005), the effect of a covariate on the DE
can be measured by estimating a model for the hazard of a position being
sold that includes an interaction term between the covariate and the paper
gain indicator variable described in section 2.3. If the hazard ratio for the
interaction term is greater (less) than one then the covariate makes the DE
stronger (weaker). Interaction terms were initially added individually to a
frailty model containing all main effects described in section 2.3. In this
first stage, all covariates had a significant interaction with the paper gain
indicator at the 5% level, with the exception of the SIC industry categories.
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Hence only the main effects for this variable were included in subsequent
models.
Both a marginal and frailty model containing all main effects and gain in-
dicator interactions were then estimated. Table 2.3 contains hazard ratios
for interaction terms that had significant coefficient estimates in both the
frailty and marginal models. Significance was tested at the 5% level using
the Wald statistic. As can be seen, the hazard ratios are broadly similar in
both models. Table 2.4 contains hazard ratios for interaction terms that had
significant coefficient estimates in the frailty model but not in the marginal
model. The differences between models are larger for these covariates, and
in each case the hazard ratio for the marginal model is closer to one i.e. a
smaller effect. However the lack of significance itself in the marginal model
is the most notable difference.6 Had a marginal model been used exclusively
then the analysis would show that gender, income and diversification did not
have an effect on the DE. Full regression results for the frailty interactions
are provided in section 2.5.1, and in the appendix for the main effects. The
full results for the marginal model are also provided in the appendix.
HR: frailty HR: marginal
Gain * Experience: None 1.693 1.568
Gain * Experience: Limited 1.367 1.292
Gain * Experience: Good 1.220 1.161
Gain * December 0.504 0.503
Gain * ’95/’96 0.762 0.742
Gain * Cap quintile 1 1.261 1.265
Gain * Cap quintile 2 1.171 1.197
Gain * Age 0.986 0.988
Gain * Tenure 3 1.213 1.192
Table 2.3: Hazard ratios for the interaction terms that were significant at
the 5% level in both the marginal and frailty models.
6In addition to those shown in tables 2.3 and 2.4, there were no interactions that were
significant in the marginal model but not in the frailty model. Such a result would be
unlikely in the presence of any substantial correlation at the investor level.
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HR: frailty HR: marginal
Gain * Male 1.159 1.104
Gain * Income 2 0.850 0.896
Gain * Income 3 0.902 0.931
Gain * Income 4 0.912 0.955
Gain * Diversification 2 0.924 0.983
Gain * Diversification 3 0.922 0.976
Gain * Diversification 4 0.858 0.936
Gain * Tenure 4 1.188 1.081
Table 2.4: Hazard ratios for the interaction terms that were significant at
the 5% level in the frailty model but not the marginal model.
Having established that the frailty model produces materially different re-
sults than the equivalent marginal model, the next step is to assess the
evidence for whether the frailty model is actually a better fit for the data,
and hence that its results provide a more accurate representation of what
is happening in reality. The significance of the frailty component itself can
be tested using a likelihood-ratio test (LRT) comparing the frailty model
with the equivalent marginal version, since they differ only by the presence
of the frailty component. The null hypothesis of this test is that the frailty
variance is zero, which would normally be problematic since it is on the
boundary of the parameter space. However, Nielsen et al. (1992) show that
the usual chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom is still valid
in this case. This LRT produces a highly significant test statistic (14,918),
indicating that investor-level correlation is present, and that modelling it as
shared frailties is supported by the data.
AIC Pseudo-R2 Concordance
Marginal 1,084,489 0.41 0.71
Frailty 1,065,433 0.66 0.79
Table 2.5: Statistics comparing the overall adequacy of the marginal and
frailty models.
Three statistics that can be used to compare the overall fit of the models
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are presented in table 2.5. They are the AIC, a pseudo-R2 statistic due
to Xu and O’Quigley (1999) and the concordance. The likelihood used
in calculating the AIC and pseudo-R2 for the frailty model has had the
frailty component integrated out, so that it is comparable with the likelihood
from the marginal model. The concordance is the proportion of all pairs of
observations for which the model assigns greater hazard to the one that
experiences an event first. A concordance over 70% is good for any survival
model, so it is reassuring that both models are able to achieve this level.
The frailty model performs better in each of these three measures, providing
strong evidence that the inclusion of a frailty component produces a better fit
to the data. The adjustment to standard errors in the marginal model does
not affect these three statistics, hence they are the same as what would be
obtained if a naive Cox model with no adjustment had been estimated.
Another important comparison to make is the degree to which the pro-
portional hazards (PH) assumption holds in each model. If the effect of
a variable appears significantly non-proportional, then the hazard ratio for
that variable is not a good summary of its effect and care needs to be taken
when interpreting it. The validity of the PH assumption will be checked for a
particular variable by calculating residuals introduced by Schoenfeld (1982),
and the graphical method for inspecting them proposed by Grambsch and
Therneau (1994). This approach was discussed in detail in section 1.7.3. A
non-zero slope in the smoothed curve plotted through the residuals indicates
a deviation from PH, with a positive slope implying the hazard ratio for this
covariate increases with survival time and a negative slope implying that it
decreases.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show SSR plots for the interactions with the gain indica-
tor for the ’Limited’ group of the experience variable, and age respectively
in the frailty model and marginal models. A horizontal dashed line is plot-
ted in each figure (and all SSR figures below) at the parameter estimate for
the variable. Clearly, there is a large departure from proportional hazards
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Figure 2.1: Plot of a smooth of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for the in-
teraction term between the paper gain indicator and the ’Limited’ group for
self-assessed experience, in the frailty and marginal models. Each curve is
plotted with an approximate 95% confidence interval. A horizontal dashed
line is plotted at the coefficient estimate for the variable in the respective
model.
Figure 2.2: Plot of a smooth of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for the in-
teraction term between the paper gain indicator and age, in the final frailty
model and an equivalent marginal model. Each curve is plotted with an
approximate 95% confidence interval. A horizontal dashed line is plotted at
the coefficient estimate for the variable in the respective model.
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in both plots for the marginal model. The interaction for age in the frailty
model did not deviate much anyway, but for the experience group the de-
viation that is there is small compared to what is observed in the marginal
model.
Overall adherence to the PH assumption can be assessed by computing the
correlation between the SSR and the survival times for each of the interac-
tion terms, as described in Grambsch and Therneau (1994). The median
of the absolute values of these correlations for the frailty model is 0.0039,
compared to 0.0193 for the marginal model. The authors also derive a test
statistic for a non-zero slope that is asymptotically χ2 under the null of no
correlation. The null is rejected at the 1% level for 19/22 of the interaction
terms in the marginal model, with test statistics that are at least one order of
magnitude larger than their counterparts in the frailty model. In the frailty
model, 8/22 have non-zero correlation significant at the 1% level. These
results are displayed in full in the appendix. Since the sample size is large,
highly significant test statistics are more likely. But interpretation of the
effect of a covariate on the DE may not change much as a result of the PH
assumption being violated. Reference to the smoothed SSR plots is there-
fore an important step when estimated coefficients are being interpreted, as
they show the nature of the deviation from PH.
These results highlight two potential advantages of using a frailty model
for measuring the effect of covariates on the DE in a dataset of this kind.
Firstly, it has been possible to significantly estimate effects which would
otherwise have been obscured in a marginal model. Secondly, doing so has
greatly reduced the deviation from proportional hazards in the interaction
terms, meaning the hazard ratios for these terms are good summaries of the
effects and can be reported with confidence.
68
HR SE p-value
Gain * Professional occupation 0.989 0.020 0.568
Gain * Male 1.159 0.039 < 0.001
Gain * Experience: N 1.693 0.068 < 0.001
Gain * Experience: L 1.367 0.028 < 0.001
Gain * Experience: G 1.220 0.023 < 0.001
Gain * Income 2 0.850 0.027 < 0.001
Gain * Income 3 0.902 0.026 < 0.001
Gain * Income 4 0.912 0.031 0.003
Gain * December 0.504 0.032 < 0.001
Gain * 95/96 0.762 0.021 < 0.001
Gain * Cap quintile 1 1.261 0.068 < 0.001
Gain * Cap quintile 2 1.171 0.045 < 0.001
Gain * Cap quintile 3 1.056 0.033 0.099
Gain * Cap quintile 4 0.981 0.025 0.435
Gain * Age 0.986 0.001 < 0.001
Gain * Diversification 2 0.924 0.024 0.001
Gain * Diversification 3 0.922 0.029 0.005
Gain * Diversification 4 0.858 0.029 < 0.001
Gain * Log sales made 0.988 0.008 0.128
Gain * Tenure 2 1.033 0.026 0.214
Gain * Tenure 3 1.213 0.025 < 0.001
Gain * Tenure 4 1.188 0.032 < 0.001
Table 2.6: Hazard ratios, standard errors and p-values for the interaction
terms in the frailty model with all interaction terms included.
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2.5.1 Frailty model results
This section will discuss the results for each interacted variable in the frailty
model, as shown in table 2.6. Hazard ratios and Wald test p-values for the
main effects are provided in the appendix. As well as the hazard ratio and
its statistical significance, the presence of any non-proportionality in the
effect of an interaction term will also be considered, as this may change the
interpretation.
In this full model, the interactions for the professional occupation indica-
tor and the log of number of sales made to date did not have significant
estimates. In the case of the sales made variable, the estimate retains its
significance in a model estimated without the self-assessed experience vari-
able. In this model, the hazard ratio is 0.977. The inter-quartile range
(IQR) for log of number of sales made is about 2.5, so an increase of this
magnitude corresponds to a hazard ratio of 0.943 (0.9772.5) and a reduction
in hazard of roughly 6%. Although not strong, there is some association
between the two variables. Regressing log sales on experience at the interval
level7 produces an R2 of 0.04. Since the effect of log sales is small any-
way in the model without experience, the addition of experience appears to
be enough to wipe it out. The professional occupation indicator still does
not have a significant estimate in a model without experience, and it is not
strongly correlated with any other variable. When tested individually, the
hazard ratio for the indicator was 1.09, meaning the DE was stronger for
investors who worked in a professional occupation. This is contrary to what
was expected based on past research. Due to its insignificance in the full
model though, the conclusion made here must be that it does not have an
effect when other factors are controlled for.
Moving on to variables that do have a significant effect on the DE, the
7Intervals are blocks of time during the holding period of a position where none of the
time-varying covariates change.
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hazard ratio for the gender interaction is 1.16, so on average the DE is 16%
stronger for men. However this is a case where the SSR plot reveals large
fluctuations of the smoothed curve for β(t) around the estimate (indicated
by the red curve and black dotted line respectively), as shown in figure 2.3.
Whilst the effect is not constant over time, it is consistently positive. Hence
the conclusion of a difference between genders in this regard still seems valid,
although the magnitude is not constant as holding period increases.
Figure 2.3: Plot of a smooth of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for the in-
teraction term between the paper gain indicator and the gender indicator
(equalling one if the investor is male) in the frailty model. An approximate
95% confidence interval for the curve is also plotted. A horizontal dashed
line is plotted at the coefficient estimate.
The experience variable has both highly significant main effects and inter-
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action terms, with more experienced investors selling positions at a greater
rate in general and exhibiting less of a DE. Compared to the ’extensive’
group, the ’good’, ’limited’ and ’none’ groups have a DE that is 22%, 37%
and 69% stronger respectively. This is the largest effect amongst all of the
categorical variables. The SSR plots show a peak in the effect after around
80 days for the ’limited’ and ’good’ categories, as shown in a plot of the
former in figure 2.4 (the shape for the ’good’ category is similar, but less
severe). This means that the difference between these categories and the ’ex-
tensive’ category takes some time to fully materialize, and also diminishes
after the holding period has reached a certain length.
For age, an increase of one year corresponds to a 3.4% reduction in DE, and
the IQR of 16 years corresponds to a 20% reduction. The SSR plot does
not show any sign of non-proportionality, hence the hazard ratio estimate
is a good summary of the effect. The results for the income variable show
that income group 1 (lowest income) has the largest DE, as expected. But
the largest reduction in DE is exhibited by income group 2 (15% reduction),
rather than the two higher income groups (roughly a 9% reduction for both).
For group 3, the SSR plot shows a stronger effect for the first 50 days of a
holding period, during which it is closer to that of group 2, before decreasing
and remaining stable for the rest of the follow-up time.
Investors with a greater level of initial portfolio diversification had a weaker
DE on average, with those holding at least 12 different stocks having a 14%
reduction in DE compared to those holding 1 or 2. Holding between 3 and
12 stocks lead to an 8% reduction, with no difference between those holding
more or less than 7 within this range. Only the SSR plot for the third group
shows cause for concern, with the effect falling to essentially zero between
roughly 40 and 80 days, as shown in figure 2.5.
Only tenure groups 3 and 4 (first account opened between 4 and 7 years
prior to start of data period, and first account opened at least 8 years prior
respectively) have significantly different effects on the DE than group 1
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Figure 2.4: Plot of a smooth of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for the inter-
action term between the paper gain indicator and the ’limited’ experience
category in the frailty model. An approximate 95% confidence interval for
the curve is also plotted. A horizontal dashed line is plotted at the coefficient
estimate.
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Figure 2.5: Plot of a smooth of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for the inter-
action term between the paper gain indicator and the third diversification
group (holding between 7 and 11 stocks) in the frailty model. An approx-
imate 95% confidence interval for the curve is also plotted. A horizontal
dashed line is plotted at the coefficient estimate.
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(account opened between one year prior and one year following the start
of the data period). Both exhibit a DE that is 20% larger than group 1,
meaning that investors who have held an account at this brokerage for at
least 4 years have a stronger DE than those who have held one for less. This
result will be discussed further in section 2.7.
As expected, the DE is reduced in December months, in fact by 50% as
shown by the hazard ratio. As shown in figure 2.6, the SSR plot shows the
magnitude of the effect increasing from -0.2 (hazard ratio = 0.82) to almost
-1.2 (hazard ratio = 0.3) by the end of the follow-up time. This means
that the reduction in DE in December is much larger for positions that have
already been held for a longer period of time. This is an important caveat
to the finding of a significant December effect that would not have been
revealed without inspecting the SSR plot.
Confirming the exploratory analysis, in this model the DE is significantly
lower in years 1995 and 1996, with the hazard ratio indicating an average
reduction of 24%. The SSR plot shows that the effect is stronger at the start
of the follow-up time and weaker towards the end, but it stays close enough
to the parameter estimate such that the hazard ratio is still a reasonable
summary of the effect.
Stocks in the bottom two quintiles of capitalization size have an increased
DE relative to those in the largest cap-size quintile. There is an increase of
26% for the first quintile and 17% for the second. There is not a significant
difference between the largest quintile and quintiles 3 and 4. Figures 2.7 and
2.8 show SSR plots for these interaction terms. Importantly, the effect is
not significantly above zero until roughly 100 days into the follow-up time in
both cases, and continues increasing after this point. Since the interaction
terms for quintiles 3 and 4 were not significant, this means that cap-size
does not have an effect on the DE until roughly 100 days into a holding
period.
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Figure 2.6: Plot of a smooth of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for the inter-
action term between the paper gain indicator and the December indicator in
the frailty model. An approximate 95% confidence interval for the curve is
also plotted. A horizontal dashed line is plotted at the coefficient estimate.
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Figure 2.7: Plot of a smooth of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for the in-
teraction term between the paper gain indicator and the first capitalization
size quintile, containing stocks with the smallest cap-sizes.
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Figure 2.8: Plot of a smooth of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for the inter-
action term between the paper gain indicator and the second capitalization
size quintile.
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2.6 Robustness checks and supplementary mod-
els
2.6.1 Model without demographic information
One thing that distinguishes the LDB dataset from others used in the lit-
erature is the large range of demographic information that is available for
some investors. The improvement in the model due to the inclusion of de-
mographic information is therefore of interest. To assess the extent of this
improvement, the frailty model from section 2.5.1 was re-estimated without
any of the demographic variables or their interactions. This includes age,
gender, the professional occupation indicator, self-assessed experience, and
income group. In untabulated results, the variables common to both models
are very similar, in sign, magnitude and significance. The only substantive
difference is that the sales made interaction is significant in the model with-
out the demographic variables. As was mentioned in section 2.5.1, the log
sales made variable was significant if the experience variable was excluded
from the model, hence the result here is not surprising.
The two models can also be compared in their overall adequacy. As would
be expected, the model with demographic variables is a better fit, judged
by a few different measures, but the difference is small. The model with
demographic variables has concordance of 0.791 compared to 0.790 for the
model without, AIC of 1,056,616 compared to 1,057,150 and pseudo-R2 of
0.655 compared to 0.652. The effect sizes for the demographic variables
are fairly small, with the exception of self-assessed experience, so the model
would not be expected to suffer greatly in their absence. But when the
model was re-estimated without these variables, new frailty values were also
computed, and since all the demographic variables are static over time, it is
likely that the frailty component was able to do a good job of adjusting for
the additional heterogeneity introduced by the their omission. This provides
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some evidence that the frailty model is also able to adjust for sources of
heterogeneity that are truly unobserved.
2.6.2 Model without demographic variables and larger
sample
In order to include demographic variables in the model, the sample had to
be restricted to investors for whom full demographic information was avail-
able. This meant the sample used to fit the final model in section 2.5.1 con-
tained 5,577 investors and 84,975 positions. This is compared to the 55,000
investors with 618,000 positions recorded in the full dataset. It is possible
that the small sample with demographic variables is biased in some way that
would result in different parameter estimates for the non-demographic vari-
ables compared to what would be obtained with the full sample. To check
for this, the model from the previous section was re-estimated but with
no demographic variables and the largest possible sample. Due to memory
constraints, this contained 364,664 randomly sampled positions.8
Table 2.7 shows the hazard ratio and estimate significance for each interac-
tion term that is common to both the model from section 2.5.1, which also
contained demographic variables, and the model estimated using the much
larger sample. The hazard ratios for the December and ’95/’96 indicators
are very similar and both highly significant. For cap-size quintiles the pat-
tern in hazard ratios is similar with positions in stocks from smaller cap-size
quintiles having a stronger DE. However the differences between quintiles 3,
4 and 5 were significant in the larger sample size model, but were not in the
small sample size model.
8Although the full dataset of positions itself is only 1.3GB in size, the procedure for
fitting a frailty model is very memory intensive. A machine with 16GB of memory was
able to fit a model using half of the full dataset, hence half of all positions were randomly
sampled. Fitting a model using this sample took 22 hours.
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HR (S) HR (L) p-value (S) p-value (L)
Gain * December 0.504 0.540 < 0.001 < 0.001
Gain * 95/96 0.762 0.812 < 0.001 < 0.001
Gain * Cap quintile 1 1.263 1.433 0.001 < 0.001
Gain * Cap quintile 2 1.170 1.207 < 0.001 < 0.001
Gain * Cap quintile 3 1.055 1.106 0.104 < 0.001
Gain * Cap quintile 4 0.980 1.078 0.419 < 0.001
Gain * Diversification 2 0.922 0.904 0.001 < 0.001
Gain * Diversification 3 0.919 0.908 0.003 < 0.001
Gain * Diversification 4 0.858 0.790 < 0.001 < 0.001
Gain * Log sales made 0.989 0.941 0.143 < 0.001
Gain * Tenure 2 1.035 1.033 0.178 0.007
Gain * Tenure 3 1.218 1.061 < 0.001 < 0.001
Gain * Tenure 4 1.190 1.099 < 0.001 < 0.001
Table 2.7: Hazard ratios for interaction terms in a frailty model that does
not include any demographic information and estimated using a much larger
sample (364,000 positions compared to 85,000), denoted by (L). Compared
with hazard ratios for the same interactions as estimated in the full frailty
model from section 2.5.1, which used the smaller sample, denoted by (S).
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There is again close agreement for diversification, with groups 2 and 3 having
a small decrease in DE relative to group 1, and group 4 having a larger
relative decrease. As expected from the supplementary models estimated
already, log of sales made is highly significant in the larger sample model,
with a hazard ratio of 0.941. For an increase of 10 sales made this translates
into a reduction in DE by 13%, and a reduction by 17% for an increase
of 20 sales made. For investor tenure, the large sample model again finds
that it is investors who have held an account for the least amount of time
(tenure group 1) that have the lowest DE, with tenure groups 2, 3 and 4
having a DE that is 3%, 6% and 10% than group 1 respectively. In the
small sample model the increase for groups 3 and 4 was much larger, around
20% in both cases. As discussed previously, the increase in DE for investors
who have held accounts for longer is the opposite of what was expected,
and the reason for it remains unknown. It could be that tenure is capturing
something else, such as an investor’s willingness to ’shop around’ for the
best terms when choosing which brokerage to trade with. Shorter tenure
may suggest a greater willingness to switch for a better deal, which may go
along with a more sophisticated approach to investing, and hence a lower
DE.
2.6.3 Recurrent positions
The frailty model estimated in section 2.5 assumes that the survival times
of positions held by the same investor are independent conditional on the
covariates and the investor’s frailty. One possible deviation from this is
the correlation that may exist between positions an investor takes in the
same stock over time. Of the 84,975 positions recorded in the sample where
full demographic information is available, 87% are positions where it is the
first time the investor has held the stock during the data period. 9% are
positions where it is the second time, and 2% where it is the third. This type
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of situation is common in medical applications of survival analysis, with one
example being a model for recurrences of a chronic condition.
All positions which are not the first time an investor has held the stock
shall collectively be referred to as recurrent positions. Since a minority of
positions are recurrent, it is unlikely that any difference in an effect for
recurrent positions would effect the overall result. But it is still of interest
to check if any such difference can be detected. The simplest way to do
this is to fit models using only first and only recurrent positions, and seeing
if the parameter estimates differ. The results from these models can also
be compared to those from the model fitted on all positions together. The
hazard ratio and estimate significance for each interaction term in the three
models is given in table 2.8
As can be seen, agreement between the three models is close in general.
When an estimate is significant in each model, the sign9 and magnitude are
similar. There is a lack of significance in all but the third cap-size quintile
interaction in the recurrent positions model, although only the first and
second quintiles were significant in the full data model anyway.
There is also disagreement when it comes to the significance of the diversifi-
cation group interactions. All three were significant in the full data model,
whereas the first two are not in the first position model and the third is
not in the recurrent position model. These results raise the possibility of
the DE-reducing effect of increased diversification only really coming in to
play for stocks an investor trades multiple times. This is something that
could be investigated in more detail in future research. Also of interest is
the significance of the log of number of sales made interaction in both the
first and recurrent position models, despite it not being significant in the
full data model. Since the effect is stronger in both the first and recurrent
position models compared to the full data model, it does not seem as if it
9Or if hazard ratios are being compared, as they are in the table, whether the hazard
ratios are above or below one.
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is a case of two opposite effects cancelling each other out in the full data
model. Again this is an issue for future investigation to explore.
Since the goal here is to test the effect of covariates on the DE, a model can
be fitted where recurrence is controlled for and the estimates in this model
checked to see if they differ from those produced by the final model in sec-
tion 2.5.1. The most general way to control for a fixed effect of recurrence
is to assign first and recurrent positions to different strata. This allows the
set of first positions to have a different baseline hazard function to the set
of recurrent positions. Hence any fixed difference between survival in the
two groups will be absorbed into the baseline hazard, preserving the effect
of covariates that is constant across the groups. In untabulated results, fit-
ting a model stratified in this way produces results very close to those in
section 2.5.1. Hence the conclusion is that the results in that section are
robust to controlling for recurrence, but as discussed above there are some
differences with recurrent positions that may be worth further investiga-
tion.
2.7 Summary and discussion
Section 2.5 showed that the addition of a frailty component significantly
improved the Cox model for position lifetimes, in terms of both goodness-of-
fit and adherence to the PH assumption. By isolating the effect of covariates
and their interactions from the unobserved frailty unique to each investor,
many more of these effects could be significantly estimated in the frailty
model. This is of particular importance in a sample like this where the
distribution of positions amongst investors is extremely imbalanced.
That the frailty model is able to control for unobserved heterogeneity is
supported by the results of section 2.6.1, where a model was fitted using the
same sample as the full interaction model, but without any demographic
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variables. The parameter estimates for variables common to both models
did not change much, which would be a concern when variables known to
be important are omitted. The overall performance of the model did also
not greatly suffer, with concordance and pseudo-R2 values close to the full
model. This suggests the frailty terms were able to ’absorb’ some of the
static differences explained by the demographic variables when the model
was re-estimated without them.
Graphically checking the PH assumption proved to be an important step
in the modelling process. Deviations from PH substantially changed the
interpretation of some effects compared to what would have been concluded
if only the hazard ratios were considered. For example, the reduction in DE
in December was shown to be much stronger for positions that had already
been held for a long period of time. This adds importance nuance to the
evidence on this topic.
2.7.1 Model results
This section will summarise the results of the analysis, making comparisons
to those in Feng and Seasholes (2005) (F&S) and (Dhar and Zhu, 2006)
(D&Z) when possible. A description of the methods used in these papers
can be found in section 1.3.2.
Demographic covariates
The DE for men was 16% stronger on average in this sample. This is in
contrast to F&S who find a DE that is 30% stronger for women, with
a much more even gender balance: 51% men in their dataset from China
compared to 80% in the LDB dataset. This suggests that gender differences
in the prevalence of the DE vary between countries, but more research on
this specific topic would be needed to understand the nature and causes of
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this variation. Despite a significantly weaker DE being found amongst those
working in a professional occupation by D&Z, no such difference was found
here. This lack of significance persists when the self-assessed experience
variable is removed from the model.
For age, an increase of one year corresponds to a decrease in DE by 1.5%, or
for the IQR of 16 years a decrease by 20%. D&Z also find that older investors
suffer less from the DE, although comparing the magnitude of the effects
is difficult due to the difference in methodology. Rather than greater age
being associated with increased investing sophistication, F&S hypothesise,
and confirm in their results, that younger investors in China will be more
sophisticated due to older investors having grown up in a radically different
economic system.
Those with incomes in the lowest of the sample quartiles have the strongest
DE, but there is not a monotonic decrease for higher quartiles. The largest
decrease in DE relative to the lowest income group was actually for the
second lowest, and there was no difference between the top two quartiles
relative to the lowest quartile. Assuming more sophisticated investors will
exhibit a lower DE, these results show that income is not a reliable measure
of sophistication when other factors are controlled for. D&Z split investors
into three income groups, and find a 10% reduction in DE for the highest
compared to the lowest. Their low and high groups correspond closely to
the lowest and highest quartiles used here, for which a 9% difference was
found.
Other investor-level covariates
Self-assessed experience proved to have a lot of explanatory power when it
came to differences in the disposition effect. Investors with the lowest level
of experience had a DE that was 69% stronger than that of the group with
the highest level. It is interesting that investors’ assessment of their own
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ability matched up so well with the extent to which they committed what
is generally considered to be an investment mistake i.e. selling winners too
soon and holding losers too long. This raises the question of why investors
who consider themselves to be inexperienced trade at all.
It may be that they hope to learn by trading and improve their performance
as they gain in experience. The results here provide mixed evidence for this
being possible. When self-assessed experience is not included in the model,
an increase in the number of trades an investor has made reduces their DE,
with an increase of 10 trades corresponding to a reduction in DE by 13%.
Importantly, only trades made during the data period can be counted, and
for some investors this will represent only a small portion of their investing
career. However, when self-assessed experience is included in the model, the
number of sales an investor has made no longer has a significant effect. This
suggests that the number of sales made is actually capturing differences that
existed before the start of the data period, and not learning that happens
as a result of the trading that’s observed.
One explanation for this is that the investors who rate themselves as having
high experience hold and sell more positions during the data period. In fact
the group with the highest self-assessed experience contains 14% of investors,
but account for 22% of all positions. The number of sales made variable will
increase faster for investors in this group, and throughout the data period
larger values for number of sales made will typically indicate an investor has
a higher level of self-assessed experience. F&S and D&Z also found that
trading more reduced an investor’s DE, but did not have a similar measure
of self-assessed experience in their models. This provides some new evidence
on the question of whether investors learn from trading, and shows that the
number of trades an investor has made is perhaps not a good measure of
gained experience by itself.
Investors with a greater level of initial diversification had a weaker DE. It
was reduced by 14% for those holding at least 12 stocks initially, compared
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to those holding less than 3. Investors initially holding 3-11 stocks had a
DE 8% lower than those holding less than three. F&S found that holding
at least two stocks corresponded to a 16% reduction in DE. It seems likely
that the effect of diversification is weaker in this model since a greater range
of variables, particularly self-assessed experience, are being controlled for in
the model relative to that of F&S.
Somewhat surprisingly, those who had held an account for the shortest time
had the weakest DE. The increases in DE for groups who had held an ac-
count for longer were smaller, but still present, in the model estimated using
the much larger sample. This is contrary to what was expected, with one
explanation being that account tenure is not measuring investor experience
or sophistication in this dataset. Tenure is positively correlated with age,
but not strongly so (Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 0.15), and the mean
value of tenure is only 4 years. This suggests there is not a strong relation-
ship between account tenure and the amount of time an investor has been
investing in total. If there was, we would expect more large values of tenure,
and large values would only be possible for older investors, hence stronger
correlation with age.
This result is also the opposite of what would be expected if investors with
lower investing ability were dropping out as a result of their poor perfor-
mance. Assuming that better investors will suffer less from the DE, and
that poor performance makes an investor more likely to close their account10,
then the investors who have held accounts the longest should have a lower
DE as a group. The decision to cease trading or even close an account is
likely more complicated than whether an investor’s trading performance has
been good or not, which itself is affected by more than just the extent to
which they have exhibited the DE. Further research would be needed to
untangle the different factors in this issue.
10Or at least stop actively trading common stocks, in which case they would not appear
in the sample used here, even if they do not close their account at the brokerage entirely.
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Stock-level and calendar covariates
The DE was greater for positions in stocks with a smaller cap-size. In
the model with demographic variables there was not a significant difference
between cap-size quintiles 3-5, but a difference between these groups was de-
tected in the model estimated with a much larger sample size in section 2.6.2.
In this latter model, the increases in DE relative to the fifth quintile (stocks
with the largest cap-sizes) were 43%, 21%, 11% and 8% respectively for
quintiles 1-4. It was important in this case to check the SSR plots, as they
showed that the effect for all quintiles does not really take effect until 100
days into the follow up time for a position. This is evidence that investors
consider different characteristics of stocks they have positions in at different
times when deciding whether to sell the position or not.
Smaller cap-size stocks tend to be more volatile and Kumar (2009b) hypoth-
esises that more volatile stocks are harder for investors to value, which makes
them more likely to exhibit a DE when trading small cap stocks. So one
possibility is that the volatility of a stock only begins to affect an investor’s
decision making after they have experienced it first-hand and seen the fluc-
tuations in price as they hold it. Unlike cap-size, the industry group of the
stock being held did not have an effect on the DE. There were differences
between groups in terms of their hazard of being sold, which merited this
variables inclusion as a main effect. But the interactions with the gain indi-
cator were not significant, even when tested in a model without interactions
for any other variables.
As expected, the DE was much weaker during December months, being
reduced by half compared to other times of the year. The SSR plot showed
that the effect increased dramatically over time, from -0.2 (hazard ratio =
0.82) to almost -1.2 (hazard ratio = 0.3) by the end of the follow-up time.
This means that, when wanting to sell a losing position in December for tax
purposes, investors sell ’old’ losses at a greater rate than losing positions
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they have not held for very long. One explanation is that investors are
more optimistic about the possibility of a price reversal in positions that
are still relatively new. This result adds nuance to the understanding of the
December effect on the DE, and provides evidence that the holding period
of a position is a factor, conscious or otherwise, when investors are deciding
whether to sell it or not. The result also raises questions that cannot be
answered by this model. It is not possible to tell whether investors are
actively choosing to sell older losses since this would require knowing if they
have a younger loss available to sell as well. It may also be the case that
investors prefer to sell positions that are further from the purchase price
when they have a choice, and older positions are more likely to have fallen
further in price.
In this dataset the DE is significantly lower in years 1995 and 1996, with the
hazard ratio indicating an average reduction of 24%. The SSR plot shows
that the effect is stronger at the start of the follow-up time i.e. for stocks
that have only recently been purchased, and weaker towards the end, but it
stays close enough to the parameter estimate such that the hazard ratio is
still a reasonable summary of the effect. These results establish that the fall
in aggregate DE during these years, as observed in Kumar (2009b), cannot
be entirely explained by other factors, such as the characteristics of investors
trading in these final two years of the data period, since they are controlled
for in the model. The decrease in DE is therefore likely due to changes in
market conditions during the data period, as discussed in section 1.5.1.
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Chapter 3
Using a mixed-effects logistic
model to analyse the
determinants of lottery stock
purchases
3.1 Introduction
Beginning with Odean (1999), studies of individual investor trading records
have found that many investors earn poor returns on their trades even before
transaction costs have been accounted for. This suggests that these investors
have poor stock selection ability. In a dataset from Taiwan, Barber et al.
(2008) find that, in aggregate, individual investors underperform the market
portfolio by 3.8 percentage points annually. They attribute roughly one
third of this gap to poor stock selection ability, with the rest being due to
commissions and tax. Using the LDB data, Korniotis and Kumar (2013)
identify low cognitive ability investors using demographic information and
find that they underperform the market by 3.6% annually. The authors
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attribute half of the shortfall to stock selection ability and half to transaction
costs.
Due to the welfare implications of adverse performance, understanding the
process by which investors choose which stocks to purchase is very much of
interest. Kumar (2009a) identifies one particular category of stock that is
over-represented in the portfolios of investors in the LDB dataset relative
to the market portfolio, which he calls lottery stocks. These are stocks that
are low in price and have returns distributions that are high in volatility
and positive skewness. This builds on the cumulative prospect theory of
preferences, introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), which predicts
investors will prefer skewed payoff distributions since they overweight the
small probability of a large gain.
Kumar identifies demographic groups with a stronger preference for lottery
stocks using an investor level regression and a measure of preference that
aggregates over the whole data period. This chapter extends this approach
by estimating a logistic regression model at the level of individual stock
purchases, with the response being the odds of a purchase being of a lot-
tery stock. This allows the inclusion of both static demographic covariates
and time-varying information about the investor’s portfolio and behaviour.
Due to the likely presence of correlation between purchases at the investor
level, a mixed effects model is used in order to control for each investor’s
idiosyncratic preference for lottery stocks.
Of the demographic covariates included, only age and income had a signifi-
cant effect on the odds of a lottery stock being purchased when other factors
were controlled for. Increases in these variables tended to lower the odds of
a lottery stock purchase, although a non-linear effect was found for age. The
odds were lower for more well diversified investors and those who traded less
frequently, and higher for investors who had displayed a stronger preference
for lottery stocks in the past. Whilst the return of the investor’s recent
lottery sales and the paper return of their current lottery positions did not
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have much explanatory power, stronger recent performance of lottery stocks
in the market was found to significantly increase the odds of lottery stock
purchases. A model with interaction terms showed that this latter effect was
weaker for more well diversified investors.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 motivates the study of
lottery stocks with reference to cumulative prospect theory, and introduces
Kumar’s formal definition of them. Section 3.3 describes the purchase-level
logistic regression model that will be used for the analysis and discusses the
importance of controlling for investor-level correlation using random effects.
Section 3.4 describes the covariates that will be included in the model. Sec-
tion 3.5 presents the main results and provides a detailed interpretation of
them. Section 3.6 presents models that supplement the main results and
checks their robustness. Section 3.7 provides a summary of the chapter’s
findings.
3.2 Stocks as lotteries
One important deviation from expected utility theory that has been observed
in a variety of settings is the tendency for people to overweight small prob-
abilities. Building upon their earlier work, Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
proposed a model for preferences, called cumulative prospect theory (CPT),
which incorporates this idea of probability weighting. They introduce a
weighting function which is applied to the probabilities of risky gambles
that the investor faces.
Barberis and Huang (2007) note that CPT preferences predict a preference
for positively skewed payoff distributions, and extend Tversky and Kahne-
man’s model to a setting where the investor must assess a continuous payoff
distribution rather than discrete. A positively skewed payoff distribution
will be highly desirable to the investor since they will overweight the small
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tail probability of a very large payoff in this distribution. In a simple market
of financial assets with CPT investors and payoffs which are normally dis-
tributed, the authors show that a new asset with positively skewed payoffs
can become overpriced and have a negative excess return as a result. Since
CPT investors would like the payoff distribution of their whole portfolio to
be positively skewed, the skewed asset is very useful to them, and hence
are willing to pay a large premium to hold it. Compared to the standard
scenario of maximizing risk-adjusted return, CPT preferences can produce
a more ’lottery-like’ approach to investing, where investors prefer to have a
small chance of a very large gain in exchange for a high chance of moderate
losses.
Henderson et al. (2017) solve an asset liquidation problem in continuous time
for an investor who has both the value function and probability weighting
components of CPT. In agreement with Barberis and Huang (2007) they find
that the optimal prospect for such an investor is indeed positively skewed.
They note that probability weighting discourages the investor from selling
when their asset is trading at a gain, since they are overweighting the prob-
ability that the price will increase to an even higher level. Importantly how-
ever, their model is able to predict both a preference for positively skewed
assets and a disposition effect that matches the magnitude found by Odean
(1998)1 for realistic values of the CPT parameters. This is because the desire
to wait for higher gains resulting from probability weighting is offset by the
desire to realize gains that results from the shape of the value function.
Using the LDB data, Mitton and Vorkink (2007) find that investors who
hold poorly diversified portfolios are able to achieve a much higher level of
positive skewness in the returns distribution of their portfolios than well
diversified investors. As a result of this, many of the investors who achieve
the highest return over the course of the data period hold poorly diversified
1i.e. that opportunities to sell for a gain are taken at a rate that is roughly 50% greater
than the rate at which opportunities to sell for a loss are taken.
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portfolios. The authors also document a consistent trade-off between the
Sharpe ratio (excess return divided by standard deviation) and skewness
of investor portfolios, implying that some investors sacrifice risk-adjusted
returns in order to increase the positive skewness they are exposed to.
Kumar (2009a) extends the idea and formally defines a category of stock
that he refers to as lottery stocks. With reference to the key features of
actual lotteries, he argues that the stocks with low price, high idiosyncratic
(positive) skewness and high idiosyncratic volatility are most likely to be seen
as lottery-like by investors. Lottery tickets have a very low price relative to
the potential payoff, hence stocks with a low price are more amenable to
being treated like lotteries, particularly for the many investors in the LDB
dataset who invest relatively small amounts at a time. Stocks with higher
volatility will be more attractive since they increase the chance of an extreme
return.
3.2.1 Empirical definition
Kumar’s definition of lottery stocks is as follows. For a particular month t,
he labels each stock as either a ’lottery’, ’non-lottery’ or ’other’ type stock,
based on the previous six months of daily returns data, t−1 to t−6, which is
taken from the CRSP database. The volatility and skewness are calculated
using this set of daily returns using methods described below, and the price
is taken as the closing price at the end of month t− 1. This forms empirical
distributions for the three components in month t across all stocks in the
CRSP database. A stock is in the lottery category in month t if it is in
the top half of the distribution for both volatility and skewness, and in the
bottom half of the distribution for price. A non-lottery stock is in the top
half of the distribution for price, and in the bottom half for both volatility
and skewness. All remaining stocks are in the ’other’ category. Lottery
stocks are the primary focus of the analysis conducted in this chapter, but
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comparisons will be made with the non-lottery category in order to provide
a point of reference for the results.
The volatility of a stock in month t is the volatility of the residuals obtained
from fitting a four-factor model to the daily excess returns of the stock in
months t− 1 to t− 6, where the factors are:2
• Excess market return
• SMB: The historic excess return of small (in terms of market capital-
ization) stocks over big
• HML: The historic excess return of stocks with a high book-to-market
ratio over those with a low ratio
• Momentum: The historic excess return of stocks which have per-
formed well in the recent past, relative to those that have not
Following the method of Harvey and Siddique (2000), the skewness is that
of the residuals obtained from fitting a two-factor model to the same returns
series, where the factors are the excess market return and its square. These
variables were obtained from Kenneth French’s data library 3.
3.2.2 Past findings
Defined in this way, Kumar finds that lottery stocks make up 1.25% of
the market portfolio4 during the period 1991-96, but make up 3.74% of the
aggregate portfolio held by investors in the LDB dataset. In contrast to this,
only 0.76% of weight is assigned to lottery stocks in the aggregate portfolio of
2The excess return is the return minus the return on one-month U.S. treasury bills
over the same period.
3http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.
html
4A portfolio where stocks are weighted by their market value as a proportion of the
total value of the market.
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institutional investors. Using a variety of measures, Kumar finds that lottery
stocks under perform the other two stock categories by at least 4 percentage
points annually, and that on average, LDB investors would have achieved
2.84 percentage points higher annual returns if they had replaced the lottery
component of their portfolio with the non-lottery component.
Part of the initial work on lottery stocks by Kumar (2009a) was the estima-
tion of a regression model for the lottery stock preference of individual in-
vestors. Preference is calculated for each investor at the end of every month,
and the average across all months is used in the model.5 This model provides
estimates for the importance of different characteristics of investors whilst
controlling for other factors, such as how well diversified their portfolios are
on average. He finds that investors who are poor, young, less-educated, have
a non-professional job and live in an urban area have a stronger preference
for lottery stocks. Importantly, these groups have also been found to spend
more on actual lotteries in the literature on state lottery participation.6
However, using each investor’s preference averaged over the whole data pe-
riod precludes the inclusion of variables that are time-varying, for example
the recent performance of lottery stocks in the market, or information about
the current state of the investor’s portfolio. Kumar also estimates a time
series model for the aggregate lottery stock preference across all investors,
including information about the market and wider economy as covariates.
But this has the reverse problem of losing the ability to describe differences
between individual investors.
5Kumar uses five different measures of monthly preference, but finds the model results
are similar in each case.
6See the references provided by Kumar for details.
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3.3 Modelling approach
This chapter will seek to combine these approaches and estimate a single
model that will allow comparison between static and time-varying covariates,
in terms of their effect on an investor’s decision to purchase a lottery stock.
There are two aspects to the decision to buy a stock: which stock to buy
and when to buy it. The decision to buy a lottery stock versus another
type of stock is much more of interest than the decision to buy a stock
on a particular day versus another. These two aspects are clearly related;
investors in general will not first decide to buy a stock and then separately
decide which one to buy. Their decision to purchase or not depends on the
price, and other factors, and their evolution over time. But to simplify the
analysis and maximize the amount that can be deduced about an investor’s
decision between stocks, the likelihood of a lottery stock purchase will be
modelled conditional on a purchase having been made.
This can be framed as a prediction problem: when an investor buys a stock,
can the type of the stock be predicted using only information that could
be known in the instant before the purchase was made. Logistic regression
is a natural fit for this problem, where purchases are categorised as either
being of a lottery stock or not. Time-varying covariates can be included
by recording their state at the time of each purchase. This formulation will
allow the comparison of these time-varying factors with static things such as
an investor’s gender or occupation in terms of their effect on the investor’s
decision to buy a lottery stock.
Since logistic regression is closely related to proportional hazards (PH) mod-
els, as used in chapter 2, it is worth discussing why a PH model is not ap-
plicable here. In a PH model, the observational unit is a lifetime, which in
chapter 2 was the holding period of a stock from purchase until sale. When
a position is sold, it is compared to positions that had been held for the
same period of time but had not yet been sold. For lottery stocks, a lifetime
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could be defined as ending when the investor buys a lottery stock. But there
would be no clear start point for this lifetime. It could be the time of the
investor’s last purchase of a lottery stock, their last sale or the start of the
data period. But purchase lifetimes that are at the same point on one of
these timescales do not have anything obvious in common when considering
the likelihood of the investor making a lottery stock purchase. Hence impos-
ing this additional structure on the data when it is not needed would only
hinder learning about the reasons why an investor chooses to buy a lottery
stock.
3.3.1 Investor-level correlation
As with the PH model used in chapter 2, the issue of investor-level correlation
must be considered here too. It is reasonable to think that the propensity
to purchase a lottery stock could differ substantially between investors, and
in ways that cannot be captured by the information that is available in
the dataset. Similarly to position sales, the distribution of purchases across
investors is extremely imbalanced. In the LDB dataset there are 55,052
investors who purchase at least one common stock and 976,934 common
stock purchases in total. The median number of purchases per investor
is 7, whereas at the extreme end of the distribution there are 8 investors
with over 1000 purchases and the top 10% of investors in this distribution
account for 52% of all purchases. Clearly, if this grouping at the investor-
level was ignored then the results of a model where the observational units
were individual purchases would be biased towards the behaviour of these
most active investors.
The solution that will be used here is to introduce investor-level latent vari-
ables into the model that will control for the component of each investor’s
idiosyncratic preference for lottery stocks that is not captured by the model
covariates. These latent variables are called random effects, and their inclu-
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sion places the model in the family of mixed models i.e. a model including
both fixed effects (the model covariates) and random effects. Specifically,
since a logistic regression is being used, the model is a generalized linear
mixed model (GLMM). The random effects are the direct analogue of the
frailties used in chapter 2. Here they model an investor’s propensity to pur-
chase a lottery stock, conditional on them having made a purchase, and in
the aforementioned chapter they modelled an investor’s propensity to sell
a position that they are currently holding. Including the investor grouping
factor as a random effect rather than a fixed effect makes sense since the
goal is to control for the unobserved heterogeneity between investors, rather
than test hypotheses about differences between specific investors.
3.3.2 Mixed-effects logistic regression
In a mixed-effects logistic model, the probability of the i-th purchase by the
j-th investor being of a lottery stock is denoted as pij and defined by
log
(
pij
1− pij
)
= β>Xij + Zj
where Xij is the row of the design matrix (containing an intercept and the
covariates) corresponding to the purchase, β is the vector of coefficients and
Zj is the investor-specific random effect. The random effects are assumed
to be drawn from a normal distribution with E(Z) = 0 and V ar(Z) = θ2Z ,
with estimation of this variance being an important part of the model fitting
process.
Maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters in β and of θ2Z involves
integrating the random effects Z out of the joint likelihood. This integral
does not have a closed form solution and hence analytical methods for like-
lihood maximisation cannot be used. Different approaches to the problem
are discussed in Tuerlinckx et al. (2006). In the ’lme4’ package (Bates et al.,
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2015) in R, the integral is approximated using the Laplace method. This
allows maximisation of the approximate marginal likelihood via the use of a
standard nonlinear optimizer. In the analysis presented below the BOBYQA
algorithm, introduced by Powell (2009), is used, which has the advantage of
not requiring derivatives of the function to be computed.
As discussed in Bolker et al. (2009), the Wald statistic is preferred for test-
ing the significance of fixed-effect parameter estimates. A LRT comparing
models with and without a random effect is recommended for determining
whether the random effect is necessary. An adjustment to the critical value
for the test statistic is needed since the null value of the parameter being
tested is on the boundary of its allowable range. Zhang and Lin (2008) show
that in the simple case of testing the significance of a single random effect,
the asymptotic null distribution of the test statistic is in fact a 50:50 mixture
of χ20 and χ
2
1.
3.4 Covariates
The key advantage of using the individual buys as the observations in a
logistic regression is that time-varying factors can be included in the model
alongside static factors that were known at the start of the data period. The
covariates that will be included in the analysis can be divided into these two
categories. Note that time-varying covariates are recorded at the start of the
day on which the purchase occurs. This is because the dataset only records
the date on which a trade occurred, so the ordering of trades made on the
same day is unknown. This section will describe each covariate that will be
included in the analysis, along with justification for their inclusion and some
summary statistics.
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3.4.1 Time-varying covariates
A natural hypothesis is that having recently sold a lottery stock for a gain
would encourage the investor to purchase another stock that is similar i.e.
also in the lottery category. The mean excess return of lottery stock sales
made by the investor in the year to date was used to test this, with each
return being weighted by the dollar value of the sale.7 An indicator for
whether the investor had sold any lottery stocks in the past year was also
included in order to differentiate between investors who had sold lottery
stocks for a return close to or exactly zero, and those who had not sold any.
For 30% of all purchases, the investor had sold at least one lottery stock in
the year to date.
Similarly to the return of their recent sales of lottery stocks, strong perfor-
mance of lottery stocks the investor currently holds may encourage them
to purchase more. The value-weighted mean return of any currently held
lottery stocks is included as a covariate, along with an indicator for whether
the investor has any such holdings. The lottery category of the stock at
the time the investor purchased it is used, rather than the possibly different
category at the time the current return is being calculated. The investor
currently holds a lottery stock for 32% of purchases.
Rather than encouraging an investor to purchase lottery stocks in general,
a recent positive experience with a lottery stock may encourage the investor
to repurchase the exact same stock. Repurchases are a common occurrence,
accounting for 36% of all purchases in the dataset. This issue will be ad-
dressed in section 3.6.3 by re-estimating the model without repurchases, and
also exclusively with repurchases
As well as recent good performance of stocks they own, investors may also
7For the return of each sale, the return of the market during the holding period of
the position was subtracted, and the value-weighted mean for these quantities was then
calculated.
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% of purchases
Lottery sale in past year 30.3%
Currently holds lottery stock 32.3%
Table 3.1: Percentage of stock purchases where the investor making the
purchase had sold at least one lottery stock in the year prior to the purchase,
and the percentage where the investor held at least one lottery stock at the
time of the purchase.
Mean Median IQR
Return of lottery sales in past year 15.1 7.7 36.7
Paper return of current lottery stock positions 15.7 0.1 36.2
Market return of lottery stocks in previous month 4.8 4.3 5.5
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for the time-varying retuns covariates, cal-
culated across purchases. This includes the value-weighted mean return of
the investor’s lottery sales in the past year, conditional on at least one such
sale having been made; the value-weighted mean return of the investor’s
currently held lottery stock positions, conditional on them having at least
one such position; and the value-weighted mean return of all lottery stocks
in the market in the previous calendar month
be more likely to purchase lottery stocks if they are performing well in
the market. To test this, the mean excess return of lottery stocks in the
previous calendar month, weighted by their market value, was included in
the analysis. In section 3.6.1 this variable is interacted with others to test
whether different groups are effected by it to different extents. Summary
statistics for these indicator and return variables are presented in tables 3.1
and 3.2 respectively.
The next set of covariates contain information about the current state of
the investor’s portfolio and their behaviour since the start of the data pe-
riod. The logarithm of the current number of positions the investor holds is
included as a measure of how well diversified their portfolio is. The propor-
tion of their total portfolio value that is due to their largest stock holding
is included as a measure of portfolio concentration. Better diversified in-
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vestors who hold less concentrated portfolios are expected to be less likely
to purchase lottery stocks. In terms of the investor’s behaviour, the number
of actions (buy or sell) they have made so far divided by the number of days
since the start of the data period is included to control for the investor’s
general level of activity. How frequently an investor trades is an important
component of their investing style i.e. whether they are trading actively or
following a more passive ’buy and hold’ strategy. Some summary statistics
for these variables are presented in table 3.3.
Mean Median IQR Transform
Lottery buy proportion 0.1 0.0 0.1 Square root
Number of current positions 11.0 7.0 11.0 Log
Number of days per action so far 56.0 24.1 48.6 Log
Table 3.3: Summary statistics for the time-varying covariates containing
information about the investor’s behaviour, calculated across purchases. In-
cludes the proportion of the value of purchases made so far that the investor
spent on lottery stocks, the number of positions the investor currently holds
and the number of actions they have taken so far (buy or sell) divided by
the number of days since the start of the data period. Also describes the
transformation applied to each variable before being entered into the model.
The investor’s preference for lottery stocks in the past is likely to be a
strong predictor of their preference in the future. By controlling for this,
the effects of other variables will describe differences between investors who
have displayed a similar preference for lottery stocks in the past, which is
a more interesting comparison. An investor’s past preference for lottery
is measured using the proportion of the total value of all purchases they
have made so far that is due to purchases of lottery stocks. A square root
transformation was applied to this variable, as suggested by the plot in figure
3.2. Finally, calendar year dummies were included for 1992-96, with 1991
being the reference category. The aggregate preference for lottery stocks
across all investors in the sample increases substantially over time, as shown
in figure 3.1. Including these dummy variables will isolate the effect of other
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covariates from this time trend. For example, the number of positions an
investor currently holds will tend to be larger in later years since there are
more buys than sells in the sample.
Figure 3.1: Monthly time series of aggregate preference for each of the three
stock categories: lottery, non-lottery and other. The aggregate preference
for a category is the percentage of the total value of all purchases made
during the month that is due purchases of stocks in that category.
3.4.2 Static covariates
Based on the results of Kumar’s cross-sectional analysis, a variety of de-
mographic variables will be used. This includes indicators for the investor’s
gender, their marital status, whether they are retired and whether they have
a professional occupation or not. Age was included along with its square,
as a smoothed plot of the response (on the logit scale) against age sug-
gested a non-linear effect that could be accounted for by the addition of a
squared term. Kumar finds that younger, single, male investors who have
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non-professional occupations have a stronger preference for lottery stocks.8
Some summary statistics for these categorical variables are shown in table
3.4.
% of investors % of purchases
Female 7.0 6.1
Male 93.0 93.9
Non-professional 36.7 37.6
Professional 63.3 62.4
Non-retired 84.9 83.2
Retired 15.1 16.8
Married 80.8 82.2
Single 19.2 17.8
Table 3.4: Distribution of static categorical covariates across investors and
purchases
The natural logarithm of income will also be included, with investors who
have lower incomes expected to have a stronger preference for lottery stocks.
As well as the number of stocks the investor holds at the time of the purchase,
as mentioned in the previous section, the number they held at the beginning
of the data period is also included. This latter variable is referred to as the
investor’s initial diversification. Both variables being significant in the model
will indicate that deviations away from the investor’s initial diversification
have some predictive power for lottery stock purchases. Also included is
the time in years from the date the investor opened their first account at
the brokerage until the start of the data period, which is referred to as
the investor’s tenure. Negative values occur for investors that opened their
account after the start of the data period. The results in chapter 2 suggested
investors who opened an account most recently may actually be the most
sophisticated, contrary to what was expected. Including it here will provide
more evidence on the issue. A summary of these continuous static covariates
8Whilst age and some of the other covariates in this section can (or do, in the case of
age) change over time, all of them were recorded only once in the dataset, and as such
are entered into the model as they were at that point in time.
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is presented in table 3.5
Mean Median IQR Transform
Age 50.9 48.0 16.0 With square term
Income ($) 171100.0 75000.0 62500.0 Log
Tenure (years) 4.0 3.8 5.5 No transform
Initial diversification 5.3 3.0 4.0 Log
Table 3.5: Summary statistics for static continuous covariates. Calculated
across investors, rather than stock purchases. Also describes the transfor-
mation, if any, applied to the variable before being entered into the model.
Initial diversification is the number of stocks the investor held at the start
of the data period.
In the LDB dataset there are 976,934 stock purchases where there is suffi-
cient data in the CRSP database to categorise the stock as either lottery or
not at the time of the purchase. However, as with the model in chapter 2,
missing data amongst the demographic covariates means that only a rela-
tively small proportion of the sample can be used to estimates a model that
contains these variables. Age, gender, income and marital status informa-
tion is missing for 40-55% of purchases. Since different variables are missing
for different investors, collectively this means that only 92,975 have com-
plete information for the model containing all covariates mentioned in this
section. This is still a large sample, particularly for a mixed-effects model of
the kind described in section 3.3.2. So if they exist, it should be possible to
detect even small effects. As was done in chapter 2, a model without demo-
graphic covariates was also estimated using a much larger sample, to see if
the estimated effects of the other covariates are materially different. This is
the subject of section 3.6.4. Of the remaining purchases in the sample with
full demographic information, 9.1% are purchases of lottery stocks.
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Figure 3.2: Cubic smoothing spline fits for the response variable (1 if the
buy was of a lottery stock and 0 otherwise) plotted on the logit scale against
covariate values. The regression model assumes a linear relationship on this
scale, hence the plots for the transformed variables on the right demonstrate
closer adherence to this assumption.
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3.5 Model estimation results
3.5.1 Testing significance of the random effect compo-
nent
Table 3.6 presents regression results for the mixed effect logistic model con-
taining all the covariates described in section 3.4. The first step in interpret-
ing this model is to establish that the random effect component improves
the fit of the model. With reference to Bolker et al. (2009), the preferred
method is to use a LRT comparing the model with the corresponding GLM
i.e. the same model without random effects. This produces a test statistic of
985.82, which is highly significant (p-value  0.001) compared to the refer-
ence distribution under the null of no significant difference, which is a 50:50
mixture of the χ20 and χ
2
1 distributions. The estimate for the random effect
standard deviation is 0.781, with a 95% profile likelihood confidence interval
given by (0.723, 0.841). These results provide strong evidence that a model
including investor-level random effects is supported by the data.
3.5.2 Residuals
As is standard in regression analysis, the adequacy of the estimated model
can be assessed using a residual quantity. For GLMs where the response can
only take on a small number of values, the residual produced by subtracting
the fitted value from the response is also restricted to the same small number
of values. This limits the amount of variation that is visible in standard
diagnostic plots of the residuals and hence makes it difficult to identify
model inadequacies. As an alternative, the randomized quantile residuals
(RQRs), introduced by Dunn and Smyth (1996), will be used to assess the
model. The idea of these residuals is to add random noise to the value of
the theoretical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of each observation,
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which produces a set of residuals that can be treated as continuous. If the
model is true then these residuals should constitute an i.i.d. sample from the
standard uniform distribution, a property that can be easily tested.
Let F (yij;µij) be the CDF of the i-th purchase made by the j-th investor,
where µij = E(yij). µij is a function of the covariates Xij, the parameters β
and the random effect Zj. Let aij = supy<yij F (y, µˆij) and bij = F (yij, µˆij),
then the RQR for purchase ij is defined by
rij = U(aij, bij)
which denotes a uniform random variable on the interval (aij, bij]. If the
model is true, meaning each observed yij was in fact generated by the dis-
tribution defined by F (yij;µij), then these residuals will constitute a sample
from the standard uniform distribution, U(0, 1).9
For a logistic model this simplifies to
rij =
U(0, 1− pˆij) if yij = 0U(1− pˆij, 1) if yij = 1
where pˆij is the fitted value for purchase ij. A QQ plot can be used as a
first check of whether the residuals have the expected distribution. For this
purpose, Dunn and Smyth recommend converting the residuals to quantiles
of the standard normal distribution by applying the inverse CDF of the stan-
dard normal distribution, as QQ plots for the standard normal distribution
are more familiar. A normal QQ plot for one realization of the RQRs is
shown in figure 3.3. On the evidence of this plot, the residuals adhere very
closely to the expected distribution.
To further check the integrity of the model, the residuals can be plotted
9See Feng et al. (2017) for a proof of this.
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Figure 3.3: QQ plot comparing a realization of the RQRs for the mixed-
effects logistic model with the standard normal distribution. The RQRs
have been converted into quantiles of the standard normal distribution by
applying the inverse CDF of this distribution to them.
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against the fitted values. The original RQRs, which should be uniformly
distributed, are recommended for this plot since it is easy to assess whether
the mean is close to the expected value of 0.5 at all magnitudes of the fitted
values. Due to the random element inherent to the process, Dunn and Smyth
recommend generating four realizations of the residuals and discounting any
apparent patterns that are not common to all of them. Figure 3.4 contains
plots against the fitted values for four such realizations. The first, in the
top left of the plot, is the same realization as was used for the QQ plot in
figure 3.3. A smoothing spline has been added to each plot, which can be
compared to the horizontal line indicating the expected value of 0.5. These
plots reveal a clear tendency for the residuals to be larger than expected
for purchases with large fitted values. This means that, amongst this group
of purchases, there are more lottery purchases than would be expected if
the model was true. This suggests the model is missing a factor that could
explain the very strong preference for lottery stocks of some investors.
For comparison, figure 3.5 contains four realizations of the RQRs for the
corresponding model without random effects. The same pattern is visible
in these plots, and to a much greater extent. This provides reassurance
that the model is significantly improved by the inclusion of random effects,
and hence also that the deviation from uniformity in the scatter plots for
the mixed-effects model is small compared to what results from a major
misspecification of the model. So whilst these plots suggest the current
model could be improved, the pattern in the residuals is not severe enough
to invalidate the conclusions drawn from the model results. The analysis
can therefore proceed to a detailed interpretation of these results, which is
the focus of the next section.
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Figure 3.4: Four realizations of the RQRs for the mixed-effects logistic
model, plotted against the fitted values of the model. A smoothing spline
has been added to each plot to help identify deviations from the expected
value of 0.5.
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Figure 3.5: Four realizations of the RQRs for the logistic model without
random effects, plotted against the fitted values of the model. A smoothing
spline has been added to each plot to help identify deviations from the
expected value of 0.5.
115
3.5.3 Interpretation of full model
As mentioned in section 3.4, many of the continuous covariates were cen-
tred when entered into the model (mean subtracted and divided by standard
deviation) as this is known to help with convergence in GLMMs.10 Other
transformations, such as the natural logarithm and square root, were applied
to some variables prior to them being centred in order to bring the relation-
ship with logs odds closer to being linear. This means that the effects of
these variables is not obvious from their coefficient estimates in table 3.6,
and care needs to be taken to reverse the transformations in order to produce
a meaningful interpretation. Two things in table 3.6 that are informative
are the sign of the coefficient estimate, with a positive value indicating that
a purchase being of a lottery stock becomes more likely as the covariate in-
creases, and the Wald test p-values, which can be interpreted in the normal
way. The remainder of this section will discuss these regression results in
detail.
Throughout the following, covariates will be described as either raising or
lowering the odds of a lottery stock purchase as their values change. As
was discussed in section 3.3, the model is actually estimating the effect of
covariates on the odds of a particular purchase being of a lottery stock,
conditional on that purchase being made. This less precise language is used
purely for convenience and the conditional nature of the model should be
kept in mind.
Time-varying information about the investor’s portfolio and trad-
ing history
An investor’s past preference for lottery stocks is a strong predictor of their
future preference, as shown by the lottery buy proportion variable, which is
10See for example the ’convergence’ section of the lme4 documentation.
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Coefficient SE p-value
Intercept -3.355 0.104 < 0.001
Lottery sale in past year -0.024 0.036 0.516
Return of lottery sales in past year 0.027 0.012 0.026
Currently holds lottery stock 0.365 0.035 < 0.001
Paper return of current lottery stock positions -0.006 0.014 0.64
Portfolio concentration 0.142 0.071 0.045
Log(Number of current positions) -0.210 0.033 < 0.001
Log(Number of days per action so far) -0.136 0.032 < 0.001
Sqrt(Lottery buy proportion) 1.083 0.098 < 0.001
Return of lottery stocks in previous month 0.085 0.013 < 0.001
Gender: Male 0.071 0.086 0.413
Age 0.396 0.163 0.015
Squared(Age) -0.490 0.167 0.003
Marital status: Single 0.024 0.054 0.653
Log(Initial diversification) -0.019 0.027 0.487
Tenure -0.015 0.022 0.496
Log(Income) -0.090 0.022 < 0.001
Professional occupation 0.056 0.052 0.281
Retired 0.094 0.079 0.234
Year: ’92 -0.019 0.047 0.683
Year: ’93 0.210 0.050 < 0.001
Year: ’94 0.338 0.057 < 0.001
Year: ’95 0.563 0.058 < 0.001
Year: ’96 0.657 0.061 < 0.001
Table 3.6: Results from estimating a logistic regression model with investor-
level random effects for lottery stock purchases.
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the proportion of the total value of the investor’s purchases made so far that
was spent on lottery stocks. Exploratory analysis suggested a square root
transformation should be applied to this variable, and as such the effect of
a change in it on the log odds depends on the specific values as well as the
difference between them since the transformation is non-linear.
Table 3.7 provides some examples of changes in lottery buy proportion and
their effect on the odds of a purchase being of a lottery stock. The effect
of this variable is large compared to others in the model. An investor for
whom lottery stocks have made up 90% of their purchase value so far is
almost twice as likely to purchase a lottery stock than an investor for whom
10% of their purchase value has been of lottery stocks. That this covariate
is an important predictor of lottery stock purchases is expected, and shows
that it is fulfilling its primary purpose in the model, which is to control
for the investor’s past preference when estimating the effect of other, more
interesting variables.
Increase in buy proportion % increase in odds
0.25 → 0.5 25.2%
0.5 → 0.75 19.0%
0.1 → 0.9 98.4%
Table 3.7: Change in odds for some example increases in the proportion
of the total value of their purchases to date that an investor has spent on
lottery stocks.
One of the main hypotheses in this analysis was that positive past experience
with lottery stocks would encourage an investor to purchase more in the
future. To test this, the excess mean return of any lottery stock sales the
investor made in the previous year was included in the model, along with an
indicator for whether the investor did indeed sell any lottery stocks in the
previous year or not. The coefficient estimate for the indicator variable was
not significant, but was for the mean return, although only at the 5% level
which is fairly weak compared to many of the other effects in the model.
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Reversing the scaling on the coefficient reveals that an increase in return of
10 percentage points only increases the odds of a lottery stock purchase by
0.7%, and an increase of 30 percentage points (which is the IQR across all
purchases) increases it by 2.3%. So whilst these results show that a greater
return on recent lottery stock sales increases the chance an investor will
buy a lottery stock in future, the effect is small compared to others in the
model.
Also of interest was the mean paper return of lottery stocks positions that
the investor currently holds. As well as this return, an indicator for whether
the investor did hold any lottery stocks at the time was also included. In this
case, the estimate for the return variable was not significant, whereas it was
for the indicator. As would be expected, currently holding a lottery stock
makes a purchase of another more likely, with the odds increasing by 44%.
This indicator will clearly be capturing similar information as the lottery
buy proportion variable, but the fact that both are significant shows that
an investor who currently holds a lottery stock is more likely to buy another
relative to an investor that does not, even if both have displayed a similar
preference for lottery stocks in the past.
Moving on to more general information about the investor’s behaviour and
trading style, the results show that investors with more concentrated portfo-
lios, where a larger proportion of their portfolio value is assigned to a single
stock, are more likely to purchase lottery stocks. The coefficient estimate is
only significant at the 5% level however, and the effect is small. Holding 3
equally weighted stocks rather than just 1 (which lowers concentration from
1 to 0.33) decreases the odds of a lottery stock purchase by 9%, and similarly
holding 10 rather than 3 decreases the odds by 3%. So portfolio concentra-
tion is informative about an investor’s tendency to buy lottery stocks, but
not strongly so when the other factors in the model are controlled for.
Related to portfolio concentration is the number of positions the investor
currently holds in total. Since this variable is highly skewed, its natural
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logarithm was entered into the model, with 1 added to the total prior to the
transformation in order to avoid taking the logarithm of zero. This variable
was highly significant and had a fairly large effect for differences that would
be common to observe in the data. An increase from 1 to 3 positions reduced
the odds of a lottery stock purchase by 13%, an increase from 3 to 12 reduced
the odds by 21% and an increase from 12 to 20 positions reduced the odds
by 9%. Holding more positions means the investor is better diversified,
and this is generally thought to indicate a more sophisticated approach to
investing. More sophisticated investors being less likely to purchase a lottery
stock is in line with both the empirical findings in Kumar (2009a), and the
accompanying theory about which groups of investors will find lottery stocks
most appealing. It is also worth noting that the fluctuations inherent to high
volatility stocks will be more damaging for investors who do not have the
’cushion’ of a well diversified portfolio to absorb potential losses.
Another important dimension to an investor’s trading behaviour is how fre-
quently they trade. This needed to be controlled for so that the effect of
other covariates that could proxy for it was not obscured. It was included
in the model by dividing the number of trading days from the start of the
data period to the time of the purchase by the number of actions, buy or
sell, that the investor took during that time. This quantity was then logged
and centred. A higher value indicates that the investor takes actions less fre-
quently than an investor with a lower value. The results show that the odds
of buying a lottery stock are 13% lower for an investor who has traded once
per month (21 days per action on average) compared to one who has traded
once per week (5 days per action). Similarly, the odds are 22% lower for an
investor who has traded once per year (250 days per action on average) com-
pared to one who has traded once per month. Lottery stocks naturally lend
themselves to a more active trading style due to their volatile nature. The
median holding period for lottery stocks positions is 114 days, compared to
189 for non-lottery stocks. However, trading frequently can also result from
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overconfidence, as explored by Barber and Odean (2000), who find that fre-
quent trading typically leads to poorer performance. Less frequent trading
could therefore indicate a more sophisticated investor.
Static investor-level covariates
Amongst the static covariates, only age and income had significant param-
eter estimates. Despite explaining variation in the preference for lottery
stocks when aggregated over the whole data period, as was done by Kumar,
the remainder of these variables had no effect in this model when other fac-
tors were controlled for. This includes indicators for the investor’s gender,
marital status, whether they are retired, whether they are in a professional
occupation and their account tenure in years11. The investor’s diversification
at the start of the data period was also not significant, although as would be
expected this variable is correlated with the number of positions the investor
holds at the time of the purchase (Pearson correlation = 0.52), so it is likely
that it would be significant if that variable was not included.
For age, the coefficient estimate for age itself is positive, implying lottery
stock purchases become more likely as age increases, but the coefficient is
negative for the square of age. Since squaring is a non-linear transformation,
the effect on the odds depends on both the difference in age and the mag-
nitude of the two ages being compared. Table 3.8 shows the change in odds
for some example differences in age. The median age of investors in this
sample is 48, so for investors in the top half of the age distribution, older
investors are less likely to purchase lottery stocks relative to younger ones,
provided the age difference is at least a few years. However the opposite will
usually be true for investors below the median age. This adds important
nuance to understanding the relationship between age and preference for
lottery stocks.
11Kumar calls this variable ’investment experience’.
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Difference in age % change in odds
30 → 40 6.6%
50 → 60 -7.0%
25 → 50 12.3%
50 → 75 -27.2%
Table 3.8: Change in odds for some example differences in age
As expected, investors with higher income are less likely to purchase a lottery
stock. A doubling of income, which is roughly the difference between the
25th and 75th percentiles, results in a 7.4% reduction in odds. Income at
the 90th percentile is 4.3x larger than at the 10th percentile, which equates
to a 15% reduction in odds.
Exogenous covariates
In agreement with Kumar’s aggregate results, better recent performance of
lottery stocks in the market increased the odds of lottery stock purchases.
An increase in the excess return of lottery stocks by one percentage point in
the previous calendar month raised the odds of a lottery stock purchase by
1.7%. An increase of 5 percentage points, which is roughly equal to the IQR
across all months in the dataset, raised the odds by 8.6%. An increase of
10 percentage points, which is roughly the difference between the 10th and
90th percentiles, raised the odds by 17.9%. Two immediate questions are
whether some groups of investors are more or less sensitive to this effect, and
if the effect is particular to lottery stocks or would be present for another
group as well. These questions are addressed in sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2
respectively.
The calendar year dummies show that the odds of a lottery stock purchase
are much greater for later years, even after the other factors in the model
have been controlled for. The odds are 23%, 40%, 76% and 93% large in
years 1993-96 respectively, compared to those in 1991, with no significant
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difference between 1991 and 1992. The magnitude of this change shows
the importance of controlling for it when measuring the effect of other co-
variates. As discussed in section 1.5.2, the period of time covered by this
dataset was one of sustained growth in the U.S. stock market, which was ac-
companied by increased interest and confidence amongst the general public.
However, in the same dataset Kumar finds evidence that aggregate demand
for lottery stocks is greater during economic downturns, for example when
the unemployment rate is higher. Further investigation would be required
to discover what was driving the aggregate trend of increasing demand for
lottery stocks, and whether the trend continued beyond the end of the data
period.
3.6 Supplementary models
3.6.1 Is the recent performance of lottery stocks less
important for some groups of investors?
The importance of the recent performance of lottery stocks in the market,
specifically their return in the previous calendar month, raises the question
of whether some groups of investors may be more or less sensitive to this
effect. This was tested by re-running the model with the addition of inter-
actions between the lottery returns variable and a set of the other covariates
that may capture differences in sophistication or investment style. These in-
teracted variables include age, gender, income, portfolio concentration, the
number of currently held positions, the number of days per action so far,
the investor’s initial diversification and the indicators for if the investor is
retired, has a professional occupation and their marital status. Regression
results for these interaction terms are presented in table 3.9.
Of these interactions, only the one with the number of currently held posi-
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Coefficient SE p-value
RLPM * Age -0.104 0.097 0.285
RLPM * Squared(Age) 0.106 0.098 0.283
RLPM * Log(Income) -0.024 0.012 0.051
RLPM * Portfolio concentration -0.057 0.060 0.345
RLPM * Log(Number of current positions) -0.081 0.020 < 0.001
RLPM * Log(Number of days per action so far) -0.033 0.018 0.071
RLPM * Gender: Male -0.026 0.051 0.613
RLPM * Professional occupation 0.056 0.031 0.071
RLPM * Log(Initial diversification) -0.010 0.016 0.552
RLPM * Retired 0.038 0.046 0.411
RLPM * Marital status: Single -0.064 0.031 0.04
Table 3.9: Results for interactions with the variable recording the return of
lottery stocks in the previous calendar month (RLPM) when added to the
logistic regression model with investor-level random effects.
tions had a significant coefficient estimate at the 1% level. The coefficient
for this interaction was negative, meaning that increases in recent lottery
performance are less effective at raising the odds of a lottery stock purchase
for investors who hold a larger number of positions. Table 3.10 shows the
change in odds when the market return of lottery stocks for the previous
calendar month increases by 5 and 10 percentage points, for investors who
hold 1, 5, and 10 positions but are otherwise identical. Whilst an increase in
lottery return raises the odds of a lottery stock purchase for an investor who
holds only 1 position, for an investor who holds 10 positions such an increase
actually decreases the chance of them purchasing a lottery stock.
3.6.2 Equivalent model for non-lottery stocks
A model like the one in section 3.5.1 could in theory be estimated for any
category of stock in order to see which factors are important in the decision
to purchase them. To demonstrate this, and as a comparison to the results
of the model for lottery stocks, an equivalent model was estimated for non-
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Number of positions Increase in lottery returns (ppts) Change in odds
1 5 11.9%
10 25.3%
5 5 3.0%
10 6.2%
10 5 -1.6%
10 -3.1%
Table 3.10: Examples of the effect on the odds of a lottery stock purchase
for increases in the return of lottery stocks in the market in the previous
calendar month (denoted in percentage points) for investors who currently
hold 1, 5, and 10 positions.
lottery stocks. This is a category of stocks also defined by Kumar that are
essentially the opposite of lottery stocks. In a particular month, non-lottery
stocks are those that are in the bottom half of the distribution for volatility
and skewness, and in the top half for price. They tend to be large-cap stocks
and hence account for a greater proportion of purchases in the dataset than
lottery stocks: 29% compared to 9%. The estimated model contained all the
same covariates as in section 3.5.1, but with the category of stock changed
where appropriate. For example, the paper return of the investor’s currently
held non-lottery stock positions was included, as well as the market return
of non-lottery stocks in the previous month. The results are shown in table
3.11
Since non-lottery stocks can be thought of as the opposite of lottery stocks,
covariates capturing information about investment style and sophistication
might be expected to have the reverse of the effect they had in the lot-
tery model. This is true in some cases: investor’s who trade more actively
(smaller number of days per action) and hold more concentrated portfolios
have lower odds of purchasing a non-lottery stock. Investors with greater
initial diversification, larger incomes, a non-lottery stock currently in their
portfolio and who had purchased more non-lottery stocks in the past had
increased odds. As expected from figure 3.1, the calendar year indicators
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Coefficient SE p-value
Intercept -0.785 0.074 < 0.001
Non-lottery sale in past year -0.026 0.023 0.254
Return of non-lottery sales in past year 0.008 0.008 0.325
Currently holds non-lottery stock 0.175 0.029 < 0.001
Paper return of current non-lottery stock positions -0.133 0.033 < 0.001
Portfolio concentration -0.148 0.047 0.002
Log(Number of current positions) -0.104 0.022 < 0.001
Log(Number of days per action so far) 0.223 0.022 < 0.001
Sqrt(Non-lottery buy proportion) 0.447 0.051 < 0.001
Return of non-lottery stocks in previous month -0.017 0.009 0.045
Gender: Male -0.098 0.060 0.1
Age -0.077 0.112 0.491
Squared(Age) 0.212 0.113 0.061
Marital status: Single -0.027 0.038 0.472
Log(Initial diversification) 0.097 0.019 < 0.001
Tenure 0.006 0.016 0.715
Log(Income) 0.044 0.016 0.006
Professional occupation -0.022 0.037 0.553
Retired 0.092 0.054 0.092
Year: ’92 -0.204 0.028 < 0.001
Year: ’93 -0.413 0.032 < 0.001
Year: ’94 -0.714 0.036 < 0.001
Year: ’95 -0.685 0.039 < 0.001
Year: ’96 -0.868 0.041 < 0.001
Table 3.11: Results from estimating a logistic regression model with investor-
level random effects for non-lottery stock purchases.
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confirm that purchases of non-lottery stocks are much less likely in later
years. All else being equal, the odds of a purchase being of a non-lottery
stock purchase are 58% lower in 1996 relative to 1991.
Some of the results are more surprising. Despite its importance in the lottery
stock model, neither age nor its square were significant predictors of non-
lottery stock purchases. Likewise, the indicator for whether the investor
had sold a non-lottery stock in the past year, and the return of any such
sales were both insignificant at the 5% level. Whereas greater initial diver-
sification increased the odds of an investor purchasing a non-lottery stock,
their level of diversification at the time of the purchase had the opposite
effect. Only the latter variable was significant in the lottery model (odds
decreasing as current level of diversification increases), whereas they both
are in this model. The two effects are similar in magnitude however, so
for example the odds of purchasing a non-lottery stock for an investor who
held 2 stocks at the start of the data period and holds 2 now are not much
different from an investor who held 10 stocks at the beginning and holds
10 now. One interpretation of these results is that, for two investors who
had the same level of initial diversification, the investor with a lower level of
current diversification is more likely to purchase a non-lottery stock. If an
investor feels that their current level of diversification is not sufficient, then
purchasing a non-lottery stock probably makes more sense than purchasing
any other type. Hence the odds of a non-lottery stock purchase increase as
the number of stocks currently held falls. This is one plausible explanation,
but it is hard to rule out others on the basis of these results alone.
Whilst currently holding a non-lottery stock did make an investor more likely
to purchase another, conditional on this, investors whose current non-lottery
holdings were performing better were actually less likely to purchase another
non-lottery stock. In agreement with this latter result, strong performance
of non-lottery stocks in the market during the previous calendar month
also reduces the odds of non-lottery stock purchases. This could be due to
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mental accounting12, and would be consistent with the behavioural portfolio
theory of Shefrin and Statman (2000) in which investors construct their
portfolios in layers which have different purposes. If an investor has a non-
lottery component to their portfolio that is intended to provide security,
then strong performance of this component may make the investor feel more
able to expand the other components of their portfolio and therefore be less
likely to purchase additional non-lottery stocks.
This suggests that strong performance of non-lottery stocks might increase
the odds of lottery stock purchases. However, in untabulated results, the
indicator for currently holding a non-lottery stock and the paper return of
an investor’s current non-lottery holdings are not significant when added to
the lottery stock model of section 3.5.1. This means that when non-lottery
stocks are performing well in the market and the investor’s own portfolio,
they are choosing to purchase stocks that are somewhere in between the two
extremes of the lottery and non-lottery categories.
3.6.3 The importance of repurchases
The results in section 3.5 provide strong evidence (p-value < 0.001) that
investors who have purchased more lottery stocks in the past are more likely
to purchase them in the future, and weaker evidence (p-value = 0.026) that
an increased return on the investor’s lottery stock sales in the past year also
makes them more likely to purchase another lottery stock. These results
could be explained by the tendency for investors to repurchase the same
stocks they have held in the past, and particularly stocks they have had a
positive prior experience with. Strahilevitz et al. (2011) find that, amongst
stocks they have previously held, investors are more likely to repurchase
stocks that they have previously sold for a gain and which have decreased
in price subsequent to the sale. Jiao (2015) finds that more experienced
12First introduced by Thaler (1985)
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and sophisticated investors are less biased against stocks they have previ-
ously sold for a loss, but are still more likely to repurchase stocks they have
previously sold for a gain.
Coefficient SE p-value
Intercept -3.241 0.110 < 0.001
Lottery sale in past year -0.006 0.047 0.897
Return of lottery sales in past year 0.026 0.016 0.099
Currently holds lottery stock 0.239 0.044 < 0.001
Paper return of current lottery stock positions -0.001 0.016 0.942
Portfolio concentration 0.187 0.082 0.023
Log(Number of current positions) -0.218 0.037 < 0.001
Log(Number of days per action so far) -0.217 0.035 < 0.001
Sqrt(Lottery buy proportion) 0.645 0.119 < 0.001
Return of lottery stocks in previous month 0.099 0.016 < 0.001
Gender: Male 0.125 0.089 0.159
Age 0.438 0.168 0.009
Squared(Age) -0.534 0.172 0.002
Marital status: Single 0.003 0.055 0.964
Log(Initial diversification) -0.033 0.028 0.239
Tenure -0.011 0.023 0.623
Log(Income) -0.078 0.023 < 0.001
Professional occupation 0.058 0.053 0.277
Retired 0.073 0.081 0.365
Year: ’92 0.062 0.055 0.265
Year: ’93 0.315 0.060 < 0.001
Year: ’94 0.382 0.070 < 0.001
Year: ’95 0.637 0.070 < 0.001
Year: ’96 0.742 0.074 < 0.001
Table 3.12: Results from estimating a logistic regression model with investor-
level random effects for lottery stock purchases. Repurchases were removed,
so the sample only contained the first purchase an investor made of any
particular stock.
In the LDB dataset, 37% of purchases are of a stock that the investor has
previously held. The percentage amongst the sample used to estimate the
model in section 3.5 is very similar. This is an underestimate of the true
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value since many of the investors will already have been trading for a long
time when the data period began. To test the effect repurchases have on
the results of the model in section 3.5, the model was re-estimated with
repurchases removed i.e. with only the first purchase an investor makes of
any particular stock during the data period. The results are presented in
3.12. The proportion of the investor’s purchases that have been of lottery
stocks so far is still highly significant and has the same sign and similar
magnitude as in the original model. However the return of the investor’s
lottery sales in the past year is no longer significant at the 5% level in this
model (p-value = 0.099), although the sign and magnitude of the estimated
coefficient are the same. In untabulated results, this variable was also not
significant in a model estimated using only repurchases. This suggests that
the loss of significance is mainly a result of the reduced sample size rather
than repurchases being primarily responsible for the effect. The sample
without repurchases still contains 60,000 purchases though, so if it exists
the effect is small.
3.6.4 Without demographic covariates and a larger
sample
As mentioned in section 3.4, including demographic covariates in the model
dramatically reduces the number of purchases that can be used since data
for these variables is missing in many cases. As a robustness check, the
model was re-estimated without demographic covariates and using the max-
imum possible number of purchases. This larger sample contained 677,641
purchases compared to 92,975 for the sample used in section 3.5.1.
The results of the large sample model are displayed in table 3.13. As can be
seen by comparing these results with those in table 3.6, there is agreement
about the sign and magnitude of all effects that are significant in both mod-
els. Likewise, the indicator for whether the investor has sold a lottery stock
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Coefficient SE p-value
Intercept -3.17130 0.018 < 0.001
Lottery sale in past year 0.00001 0.013 0.999
Return of lottery sales in past year 0.01235 0.004 0.002
Currently holds lottery stock 0.40012 0.012 < 0.001
Paper return of current lottery stock positions 0.00023 0.004 0.955
Portfolio concentration 0.18853 0.024 < 0.001
Log(Number of current positions) -0.19965 0.011 < 0.001
Log(Number of days per action so far) -0.11678 0.010 < 0.001
Sqrt(Lottery buy proportion) 1.04432 0.034 < 0.001
Return of lottery stocks in previous month 0.07578 0.005 < 0.001
Year: ’92 0.03686 0.015 0.017
Year: ’93 0.20863 0.017 < 0.001
Year: ’94 0.31817 0.020 < 0.001
Year: ’95 0.50877 0.020 < 0.001
Year: ’96 0.59520 0.021 < 0.001
Table 3.13: Results from estimating a logistic regression model with investor-
level random effects for lottery stock purchases. No demographic variables
were included, and as a result a much larger sample was used.
131
in the past year and the paper return of the investor’s current lottery stock
positions are the only two main effects that are not significant amongst those
that are in both models. These results provide reassurance that the variables
with weaker significance relative to the others in the smaller sample model,
namely the return of lottery stock sales the investor made in the past year
and their portfolio concentration, do have a real effect. This supports the
conclusion in section 3.6.3 that the lack of significance of the return of lottery
sales in the past year in a model which excludes repurchases is likely due to
the smaller sample size, rather than a major difference amongst repurchases
with regards to this variable.
3.7 Summary
Variables capturing information about the investor’s behaviour since the
start of the data period and the current state of their portfolio had a strong
effect on their odds of purchasing a lottery stock. More well diversified
investors, in terms of both number of stocks held and portfolio concentration,
were less likely to purchases a lottery stock. Likewise for investors who
traded less frequently. As expected, a lottery stock purchase was more likely
if the investor had displayed a stronger preference for them in the past.
The results provided some evidence that an investor’s recent experiences
with lottery stocks had an effect on their odds of purchasing one. For in-
vestors who had sold a lottery stock in the past year, those earning a greater
return were more likely to purchase another lottery stock. However this ef-
fect was small and only significant at the 5% level, which is weak given the
sample size and the significance of other more important effects. The ef-
fect persisted and had a greater level of significance in a model estimated
without demographic covariates and a much larger sample, which provides
some reassurance that it is genuine. Whilst currently holding a lottery stock
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greatly increased the odds of an investor purchasing another, the current
paper return of their lottery stock positions did not have a significant effect.
Related to these variables is the recent return of lottery stocks in the market.
Stronger performance in the previous calendar month was found to raise the
odds of an investor making a lottery stock purchase. A model containing
interactions revealed that better diversified investors were less sensitive to
the effect of this variable.
Of the static investor-level covariates, only age and income had a significant
effect when the time-varying covariates were included in the model. Evidence
was found for a non-linear effect of age, with the coefficient of age itself being
positive i.e. odds increasing with age, and the square of age having a negative
coefficient. As expected, investors in the top half of the age distribution will
tend to have have lower odds of making a lottery stock purchase compared
to investors who are in the bottom half. But comparisons in the middle are
more complicated. The effect of income was as expected, with the odds of
lottery stock purchases decreasing with income. But again this effect was
fairly small: an investor at the 75th percentile of the income distribution
had only a 7.4% reduction in odds to compare to an investor at the 25th
percentile.
The supplementary models in section 3.6 showed that the results are not
substantially altered by either using a much larger sample as a result of
omitting demographic variables, or by controlling for the known preference
of investors for stocks they have held in the past and had positive experi-
ences with. To demonstrate that the mixed-effects model for stock purchases
can be applied to any category of stocks, a model was estimated for pur-
chases of non-lottery stocks, the qualitative ’opposite’ of lottery stocks. This
produced some surprising results that warrant further investigation. For ex-
ample, stronger recent performance of non-lottery stocks in the investor’s
portfolio or in the market reduced the odds of a non-lottery stock being
purchased.
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HR SE p-value
Neutral 1.141 0.018 < 0.001
Gain 4.214 0.067 < 0.001
Professional occupation 1.060 0.034 0.083
Male 1.044 0.062 0.492
Experience: N 0.569 0.106 < 0.001
Experience: L 0.617 0.051 < 0.001
Experience: G 0.751 0.047 < 0.001
Income 2 1.036 0.043 0.414
Income 3 1.120 0.045 0.012
Income 4 1.027 0.056 0.635
December 1.620 0.022 < 0.001
95/96 1.175 0.017 < 0.001
Cap quintile 1 0.776 0.046 < 0.001
Cap quintile 2 0.857 0.032 < 0.001
Cap quintile 3 1.006 0.024 0.815
Cap quintile 4 1.107 0.019 < 0.001
Age 1.004 0.001 0.003
Diversification 2 0.983 0.039 0.662
Diversification 3 0.855 0.052 0.003
Diversification 4 0.806 0.057 < 0.001
Log sales made 1.167 0.007 < 0.001
Tenure 2 0.990 0.045 0.818
Tenure 3 0.785 0.043 < 0.001
Tenure 4 1.000 0.060 0.995
SIC: AFF 1.086 0.228 0.718
SIC: CON 0.996 0.058 0.944
SIC: FIRE 0.775 0.017 < 0.001
SIC: MIN 0.807 0.025 < 0.001
SIC: PUBA 1.188 0.130 0.183
SIC: RETL 0.923 0.017 < 0.001
SIC: SERV 1.034 0.014 0.017
SIC: TRAN 0.686 0.018 < 0.001
SIC: WHOL 1.096 0.028 0.001
Gain * Professional occupation 0.989 0.020 0.568
Table 3.15: Hazard ratios, standard errors and p-values for the main effects
in the frailty model with all interaction terms included.
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HR SE p-value
Neutral 1.087 0.026 0.001
Gain 3.603 0.194 < 0.001
Professional occupation 1.093 0.041 0.028
Male 1.024 0.092 0.795
Experience: N 0.684 0.135 0.005
Experience: L 0.809 0.063 < 0.001
Experience: G 0.892 0.052 0.03
Income 2 1.009 0.054 0.863
Income 3 0.998 0.055 0.974
Income 4 0.915 0.066 0.183
December 1.594 0.034 < 0.001
95/96 0.854 0.031 < 0.001
Cap quintile 1 0.868 0.056 0.011
Cap quintile 2 0.925 0.040 0.049
Cap quintile 3 1.037 0.033 0.264
Cap quintile 4 1.142 0.024 < 0.001
Age 1.004 0.002 0.005
Diversification 2 0.866 0.047 0.002
Diversification 3 0.671 0.062 < 0.001
Diversification 4 0.556 0.063 < 0.001
Log sales made 1.640 0.016 < 0.001
Tenure 2 1.105 0.052 0.057
Tenure 3 0.907 0.051 0.056
Tenure 4 1.189 0.068 0.011
SIC: AFF 1.405 0.228 0.136
SIC: CON 0.992 0.058 0.893
SIC: FIRE 0.775 0.022 < 0.001
SIC: MIN 0.823 0.033 < 0.001
SIC: PUBA 1.099 0.131 0.472
SIC: RETL 0.949 0.020 0.01
SIC: SERV 1.042 0.019 0.027
SIC: TRAN 0.696 0.023 < 0.001
SIC: WHOL 1.127 0.030 < 0.001
Table 3.16: Hazard ratios, robust standard errors and Wald test p-values
for the main effects in the marginal model. Standard errors are robust to
correlation at the investor level.
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HR SE p-value
Gain * Professional occupation 0.974 0.053 0.623
Gain * Male 1.104 0.122 0.417
Gain * Experience: N 1.568 0.223 0.044
Gain * Experience: L 1.292 0.080 0.001
Gain * Experience: G 1.161 0.069 0.032
Gain * Income 2 0.896 0.071 0.123
Gain * Income 3 0.931 0.071 0.313
Gain * Income 4 0.955 0.091 0.614
Gain * December 0.503 0.042 < 0.001
Gain * 95/96 0.742 0.037 < 0.001
Gain * Cap quintile 1 1.265 0.077 0.002
Gain * Cap quintile 2 1.197 0.056 0.001
Gain * Cap quintile 3 1.090 0.045 0.055
Gain * Cap quintile 4 1.018 0.032 0.574
Gain * Age 0.988 0.002 < 0.001
Gain * Diversification 2 0.983 0.061 0.775
Gain * Diversification 3 0.976 0.074 0.744
Gain * Diversification 4 0.936 0.084 0.432
Gain * Log sales made 0.979 0.022 0.331
Gain * Tenure 2 1.035 0.070 0.623
Gain * Tenure 3 1.192 0.070 0.012
Gain * Tenure 4 1.081 0.090 0.386
Table 3.17: Hazard ratios, robust standard errors and Wald test p-values
for the interactions in the marginal model. Standard errors are robust to
correlation at the investor level.
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